TL 2012



East Timor

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Adult Education Groups

The kit provides ways
to be better informed
and more active in responding
to the issue of East Timor.

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- East Timor and the Catholic Church
- The Santa Cruz Massacre
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TL 2012-1

East
Timor

EDUCATION KIT

Introduction:

Integrating East Timor into the curriculum

East Timor: A worthy case study for the curriculum

Introduction

East Timor lies only 480 km from Darwin, a very close neighbour to Australia. As a Portuguese colony for over 400 years, it suffered neglect, particularly in the areas of health and education, social and economic development. In World War Two the East Timorese people supported Australian soldiers in fighting the Japanese forces on East Timor. At least 40,000 East Timorese died during the war.

Its recent history has been traumatic; invaded by Indonesia in 1975 and made its 27th Province by an Act of Integration in 1976. In the 17 years of Indonesian occupation, it is estimated over 200,000 people, approximately one third of the population, have died from the direct and indirect effects of the war. The United Nations, and the Vatican, does not recognise Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor. United Nations sponsored talks between Portugal and Indonesia are due to resume in September this year.

Despite its geographic proximity to Australia, East Timor is isolated. After 1975 it remained a closed territory until 1989 and many people still find it difficult to gain access. It has a large military presence and there have been continuing reports of human rights abuses.

The Catholic Church in East Timor has played a strong role in supporting the rights of the people. Over 85 % of the population is Catholic. Bishop Belo, head of the Catholic Church in East Timor has consistently called for international attention and assistance to the people of East Timor.

The Dili massacre of November 12th, 1991, drew much international attention to the continuing conflict and suffering of the people. The East Timorese communities in Australia, many of whom have lost family members, have asked the Australians to help and support the people of their homeland.

The case for integration

There are strong reasons why East Timor could be studied as part of International Studies or other school units and activities that focus on issues of social justice.

1. For students to study and analyse a current international dispute that is very close to Australia and in which Australians can contribute to a just settlement.

2. To become more aware of the historic links between Australians and Timorese such as the World War Two cooperation between the two peoples. (Australia is one of the very few countries that has recognized Indonesia's takeover of East Timor)

3. An opportunity for schools to respond to the requests of our close neighbours to help break down their isolation by being more aware and informed of their situation.

4. To know more about the culture and history of the 10,000 East Timorese living in Australia.

5. For teachers to link in with other efforts by the Australian Catholic Church, reflecting the special concern of the Bishops, to assist the East Timorse people - including the establishment of an East Timorese desk - Christians in Solidarity with East Timor (CISET) and sub-committees on East Timor working on behalf of the Diocesan Social Justice Groups in each State.

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East Timor

EDUCATION KIT

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East
Timor

EDUCATION KIT

East Timor - the facts:

A colonised nation

A colonised nation

Eighteen years under Indonesian occupation have turned East Timor into a country with all the worst attributes of a colonised territory. Indonesia claims that *integrasi* of East Timor as its '27th province' rescued it fromPortuguesecolonialism. But Indonesian colonialism has wrought far greater havoc than the Portuguese ever did in nearly 500 years of colonial rule.

Compiled by Carmel Budiardjo.

Population[1]

Between 1975 and 1979 an estimated 200,000 East Timorese - a third of the population - lost their lives because of war-related starvation and disease or because of massacres and atrocities.

- In 1980. with a normal growth rate of 1.7% per year, the population of East Timor should have been 754,000.
- The actual population in 1980 was 555,000.
- The present population level is about 800,000 of whom at least 150,000 are Indonesian immigrants.

Language[2]

There is great ethno-linguistic diversity in East Timor

- At least 14 distinct *languages* are spoken by ethnic groups ranging in size from over 100,000 to just a few thousand people.
- *Tetum* is the most widely-spoken language and is the first language in the western and southern regions and the second language in many other regions.
- *Portuguese* was the official language until 1975. It is widely spoken by people who were educated during the colonial era. It is still used in many homes alongside Tetum.
- *Bahasa Indonesia is* the sole medium of instruction and communication under the Indonesian regime.
- *Tetum and Portuguese* have been banned throughout the education system since 1975.



Economy[3]

East Timor is a resource-rich country, despite claims that it would not be viable if it became independent.

- *Coffee* is produced by large plantations as well as smallholders. Since the invasion, companies run by the Indonesian army have taken over the trade, forced down prices and frequently confiscated coffee in transit.
- *Marble* quarrying, like coffee and sandalwood, is now controlled by army-backed monopolies.
- *Oil and gas* are the largest natural resources with large reserves in the Timor Sea between East Timor and Australia. In 1989 Australia and Indonesia concluded the Timor Gap Treaty for joint exploitation of these reserves in violation of international law. Twelve multinational companies in Australia, Japan, the US and UK won contracts. The Treaty has been challenged in the Australian courts by the East Timorese resistance movement and in the World Court by the Portuguese Government.
- *Unemployment* is widespread among East Timorese. Most jobs go to Indonesians.

Religion[4]

Up to 1975 most East Timorese were animists. Since the invasion they have flocked to join the Catholic Church.

- *Roman Catholicism* was introduced by the Portuguese and was the religion of about 30 per cent of the population. Catholics now account for over 80 per cent of the population. The Church is the only East Timorese institution able to function officially, where people can gather in large numbers obtain solace and sometimes seek sanctuary.
- *Muslims* formed a minute community, mostly Arab families who settled in the country as traders. The overwhelming majority of Indonesian troops and immigrants are Muslims. Many mosques have been built. Islam is seen as the religion of the occupiers and a challenge to the supremacy of Catholicism.

Health[5]

The standard of health of the East Timorese is very low. Nothing has been done by the Indonesians to break the cycle of poverty, malnutrition and disease.

- *Infant mortality*: 160 deaths per 1,000 births. East Timor and Mali (in West Africa) have the highest infant mortality rates in the world. An Indonesian health official admitted in November 1993 that at least 70 per cent of children under five are malnourished.
- *Diseases*: the most prevalent are tuberculosis, endemic malaria, pneumonia, parasitic infestations, skin infections and severe anaemia, especially in women after childbirth and children.
- *Sanitation*: most of those resettled since 1977 live in huts standing on bare soil, crawling with insects, and with animals running in and out - formerly their houses were on stilts, giving protection against vermin and keeping animals below. There are no toilets, hardly any running water. Parasites spread through human and animal faeces.
- *Hygiene*: is abysmal at the hospital in Baucau, one of the few built by the Indonesians. There is a lack of basic equipment, patients with tuberculosis are separated from surgical cases by nothing more than a curtain.
- *Health centres*: built by the Indonesians in the towns are poorly equipped and have few medicines. East Timorese are suspicious of Indonesian medical personnel, none of whom speak Tetum, and prefer to visit the small number of clinics run by dedicated Catholic nuns.

Military[6]

The Bali-based army commander claims that combat troops are being reduced now that armed resistance has 'ceased to be a threat'. The head of the Catholic Church in East Timor says this is untrue.

- There are an estimated 10 battalions (roughly 650 men in each) in East Timor.

Military cont.

- At least one of these is there to fight the armed resistance. It is replaced every few months with fresh troops from various parts of Indonesia.
- Territorial battalions dedicated to road and village construction spy on the population, ambush villagers and, when necessary, engage in combat.
- Indonesian police are on duty throughout the country.
- Regular troops of Kodim, the East Timor military command, are located in villages for intelligence gathering and control.
- East Timorese foot soldiers are recruited into the Indonesian army - they also fight the armed resistance.
- Red-beret special troops - the most feared of all - spy on, arrest and torture East Timorese.
- Paramilitary forces known as *hansip* and *ratih* consist of East Timorese civilians trained as militia.
- A new force of 3,844 East Timorese has been formed and is now being trained.

Environment[7]

East Timor has suffered extensive deforestation.

- The region from Venilale to Los Palos in the east is now known as 'dead earth', a deserted, uncultivated plain where former inhabitants are dead and gone and all human activity has ceased.
- Much vegetation has been damaged by the use of defoliants - possibly Agent Orange - during the intense military operations in the late 1970s.
- Army-backed companies plunder resources without regard for environmental protection legislation.
- Forest fires occur annually in the dry season. Farmers who used to get rid of dried undergrowth by controlled burning have been forced down to the coastal plains. Much of the burning is now done by troops to prevent guerrillas from using foliage as cover. Without the careful management of former days the torched areas are quickly covered by the noxious, tough and impenetrable high grass *imperata cylindrica*.

Notes

1. Catholic Church census for 1974, Indonesian census for 1980.
2. Geoffrey Hull, *Mai Kolia Tetun, a course in Tetum-Praca,* Australia Catholic Relief and Australian Catholic Social Justice Council, 1993.
3. George Aditjondro *From Memo to Tutuala,* a lecture at Satya Wacana Christian University, Salatiga, Central Java, on 4 August 1993 (publication forthcoming).
4. Fr Gregor Neonbasu, *Keadilan dan Perdamaian di Diosis Dili* (Justice and Peace in the Dili Diocese), Dili, September 1992.
5. Neill A. Borowski, World Population to Stabilise in 2200, Knight-Ridder Newspapers: *Jakarta Post*, 9 November 1993; Dr Helga Brgel, 'East Timor' in Medicine and War, London, April-June 1993.
6. Bishop Belo, 'A Diary of Oppression' in *Timor Link*, Catholic Institute of International Relations, London, October 1993.
7. Report of a visit to East Timor in August 1990 by Gabriel Defert, author of *Le Genocide Oublie*: personal testimonies of East Timorese in exile.

Source: *New Internationalist*, March 1994

A brief history of East Timor:

From colonisation to resistance

1. Settlement

Many centuries of successive waves of migrants, mostly Malay and Melanesian, settled on the island with the original inhabitants, the *Atoni* people of the central highlands. This ethnic mix was compounded by the arrival of Chinese, Arab and Gujerati traders, who visited Timor in search of its valuable sandalwood. The island was divided into kingdoms ruled by princes (called *rajas* or *liurai)* and clan leaders who exercised power in kin-related villages. These contained hamlets whose inhabitants grew subsistence crops and traded with each other. The first Europeans to settle in the area were the Portuguese, on the neighbouring island of Solor in 1566. They made annual trips to Timor to collect sandalwood and trade in finished goods. Their rivals in the region were the Dutch, who followed soon after, gaining control of most of what we now know as Indonesia.



2. Colony

Although the Portuguese established a colonial administration in Timor in 1702, they disputed and fought with the Dutch for control over the island for the next three centuries. The two halves of the island finally were separated in an agreement signed by the two colonial powers in 1913 - the Dutch taking the west and the Portuguese the east. The Europeans profited from their control over the sandalwood trade and introduced coffee in the mid-nineteenth century, which became Timor's principal export, supplemented with rubber, tobacco, copra and peanuts. Revolts by the Timorese against colonial rule were frequent, and most of them were suppressed brutally. The last of these continued from the late 1880s until 1912, and was defeated with the deaths of around 3,000 Timorese.



3. Occupation

During the Second World War Timor was occupied by the Japanese, who encountered widespread resistance to their attempts to force the population to grow food, both for their troops and for export. By the time the Japanese surrendered in 1945 some 60,000 Timorese, or 13 per cent of the population, had died. In 1949 West Timor became part of the post-colonial Indonesian Republic. Portugal retained East Timor, adding a small 'legislative assembly' whose selected members were trained as an indigenous administrative elite. Economically, the Portuguese pinned their hopes on oil - discovered in 1972 - and on an expansion of tourism. An embryonic nationalist opposition emerged in the 1960s based on young people educated in Catholic schools and the Dili seminary or trained in a radicalized Portuguese army.

4. Independence

On 25 April 1974 the Portuguese Armed Forces Movement overthrew the Caetano regime and began a process of decolonization in Portugal's African and Asian colonies. In East Timor political groups were organized and given a free rein. In January 1971 the Timorese Democratic Union (UDT) entered a coalition with the Revolutionary Front for an Independent Timor (Fretilin). Both parties agreed with the Portuguese to move towards independence over a three-year period. The Indonesian military bribed and persuaded several UDT leaders to organize a coup in August 1975.

But by September Fretilin was in control of virtually all East Timor. Its leaders continued to recognize Portuguese sovereignty and called repeatedly on the Governor to return and oversee the transition to independence. Lisbon refused and Fretilin's administration became the *de facto* governmment. On 28 November, with the Indonesian invasion imminent, Fretlin leaders declared independence, establishing the Democratic Republic of East Timor.

5. Invasion

On 7 December 1975 the Indonesian armed forces invaded. The invasion was followed by brutal treatment of the civilian population - indiscriminate killings and rape in the streets of Dili, with buildings sacked and burned. By February 1976, with troops spreading out from the capital to occupy villages to the east and south, East Timor's Indonesian-appointed deputy governor, Lopez la Cruz admitted that 60,000 East Timorese had been killed.

Despite this onslaught the Indonesians controlled only the coastal and border regions and areas accessible from the country's tiny network of roads. Troop numbers were increased and draconian controls were imposed on the population isolating the territory from the outside world. In an operation beginning in late 1977 - called 'Encirclement and Annihilation' - mountain areas where people had taken refuge were bombed. In 1978 and 1979 tens of thousands of East Timorese came down from the mountains, to be rounded up and resettled in strategic villages set up by the military. Many died of hunger. Those who were were not transported to camps were either imprisoned or disappeared.

6. Control

Continuous military campaigns against the population had a devastating effect. In one called *Operasi Keamanan* ('Operation Final Cleansing') in 1981, males between the ages of eight and fifty were recruited to form human chains across the island to flush out Fretilin groups. After such campaigns many of the population were relocated in 'resettlement villages', distant from both their homes and the zones of fighting, where they were subjected to a rigorous system of internal control. Regular famines resulted.

Meanwhile, land outside the villages was devoted to the cultivation of cash crops for export in agricultural projects set up by the military, who appropriated most of the land previously under plantation crops. Land was transferred to migrants from areas outside East Timor as part of the Government's 'Indonesianization' strategy. Mosques were built at an increasing rate. East Timor's *lingua franc*, Tetum, was banned, and Bahasa Indonesian taught in schools. Informers, directed by appointed elders (*katuas*) became responsible for the surveillance of groups of 10 to 15 families.

7. Resistance

By 1979 Fretilin was almost destroyed as an organization. All its original leaders had been captured or killed, leaving behind a small group which managed during 1980 to reorganize the movement from the eastern tip of the island, attacking Indonesian targets in different parts of the country. Between March and August 1983 the Indonesian military and Fretilin agreed to a ceasefire, which enabled Fretilin to gain support for its position internationally and to persuade the UN Secretary-General to act as a mediator in the conflict.

In August the Indonesian Government unilaterally broke the ceasefire. Fretilin organized ambushes and attacks on Indonesian troops, using support networks set up in the resettlement villages. In the late 1980s these attacks became less frequent, and in November 1992 Fretilin's leader, Xanana Gusmao, was captured. This was followed by the capture of his successor Mau Honu, in April 1993. Currently Fretilin retains a resistance network in the centre, south and east of the territory, but is less capable of mounting major attacks than in earlier years; yet it continues to receive wide support from the population through an underground resistance network.

8. Opposition

Since the late 1980s opposition to the Indonesian occupation has shifted to younger East Timorese who have built up networks in the main towns and villages, notably Dili and Baucau. These groups organised demonstrations during the Pope's 1989 visit and for the planned visit of the Portuguese Parliamentary delegation in November 1991. When this visit was cancelled a demonstration in Dili went ahead on 11 November. Its suppression by the military ended in the infamous Santa Cruz massacre. Despite a deeply conservative colonial role and antipathy to Fretilin during the pre-invasion period, the Catholic Church has been increasingly critical of the military.

Both the present and former Bishops of Dili - Carlos Ximenes Belo and Martinho Costa Lopes - have denounced torture, imprisonment and human-rights abuses. Church organisations have provided basic health and education facilities, and Tetum-speaking safe havens, despite increasing opposition from the military. In January 1985 the East Timorese Council of priests called for the right of East Timor to determine its own future and referred to the Church as 'being witness to a process which is slowly leading to the ethnic, cultural and religious extinction of the people of East Timor'.

Reproduced from *New Internationalist*, March 1994. *New Internationalist* is a monthly magazine and is available on subscription from 7 Hutt St., Adelaide, S.A. 5000 for $46.50 p.a.

Timor came from the crocodile

An often-told traditional story

Long ago, a boy saw a baby crocodile fighting for his life while the sun was shining fiercely. He was trying to get from the lagoon to the sea, but the little crocodile wasn't strong and was moving very slowly. The boy took pity on him and carried the crocodile to the sea.

The crocodile was very grateful and promised that he would repay that kindness. He said if the boy wanted to travel he could go to the sea and call 'Crocodile, Crocodile', and he would come to him.

Time passed. The boy remembered the crocodile's promise. He went to the sea and after the third call the crocodile came. They were like two old friends meeting after a long time, very happy to see each other. The crocodile told the boy to sit on his back and took him on a journey. They travelled together like this many times.

Then one day the crocodile felt he would like to eat the boy. It was his instinct, being the animal he was. But his conscience troubled him and before he did this thing he went to ask the opinion of other animals. He met a whale, a tiger and a buffalo ... many animals.

All of them condemned him, saying he shouldn't repay the boy's favour with bad action. Finally he came to a monkey, the finest animal, jumping from one branch to another. For being so ungrateful he called the crocodile the worst name he could and then disappeared.

The crocodile was ashamed and gave up the idea of eating the boy. He still took the boy on his back and they travelled together until the crocodile became old. He said 'Ah, friend, the good deed you did me cannot be repaid. I am obliged to die and I will change into a land where you and your descendants will live from my fat, as payment for your kindness.'

That crocodile became Timor Island, which is the shape of a crocodile, and the Timorese are descendants of that boy. People there are always kind. They welcome others and have a sense of justice and gratitude to people and they will tell this legend to explain it.

Our people call crocodiles 'Grandfather'. When they cross a river they always call 'Crocodile, I am your grandchild, do not eat me'.

From Michele Turner, *Telling - East Timor: Personal Testimonies 1942-1992*, New South Wales University Press, 1992.

Timor Woman

Timor woman
Manacled by your misery
Timor woman
Your spirit bound in servitude
Timor woman
Forced to bear invaders' children
Timor woman
Raped, abandoned in concentration camps

Timor woman
Your feeble honesty your strength
Your bloodless voice a weapon of war
Your fragile chant the hymn of freedom

Timor woman
Campaneira bashed, imprisoned
Your song a cry for justice
Your soul anticipating death

Timor woman
You weep warm tears of blood
Your blood, *our* blood
Your face the record of our struggle
Your determination the story of our resistance

(Original poem by Xanana Gusmao, East Timor, 1991. Translated by Agio Pereira and Rob Wesley-Smith. Final English version by Peter Wesley-Smith).

Questions and research

Meet members of the East Timor Cultural Centre or community. Listen to their talks and story telling, hear their music and poetry and see some of their traditional dances as well as their art and craft work.

Resources

The track 'Kolelai Mai' on Midnight Oil's CD *My Country*.
Mai Kolia Tetum -Tetum language course by Geoffrey Hull

TL2012-3

East Timor

EDUCATION KIT

East Timor:

Cultural aspects

The Culture of East Timor

Aires De Almeida came to Australia from East Timor in the early seventies. He lives with his family in Sydney. He is one of the Directors of the East Timor Culture Centre of N.S.W. Here he speaks of the culture of East Timor, which remains an important part of his life.

Introduction

After the Indonesian invasion on 7 December 1975, much of the culture of East Timor was destroyed. With the forced resettlement of the people of separate villages and the random killings especially of the elderly, the distinctive culture is on the brink of extinction.

The rich East Timorese culture that had always intrigued me. There has been much confusion about whether or not there were any cultural similarities with the people of West Timor which is ruled by Indonesia. During the 500 years of Portuguese colonialisation in East Timor, West Timor was colonised by the Dutch. West Timor had become a completely different country and was by then, regarded as a completely different country. So the culture and legends with which I am familiar are exclusively East Timorese with the one exception being the account of the origin of the entire island itself known as the *Legend of Grandfather Crocodile.*

In East Timor, the east is called *loro sae* (sun rise) and is inhabited by the Firacoa. The central and the west of the country is called *loro monu* (sun set). These parts are inhabited by the Caladis. The Portuguese colonialists used the name Maubere in a derogatory way to any indigenous East Timorese who did not assimilate to Western culture. Maubere is now used as a symbol of national pride and presently the people of East Timor are internationally recognised as the Maubere people.

Rare and diverse culture

The culture of East Timor, unparalleled and unknown to the world, is a mixture of minicultures originated by successive waves of migration of different races from the Pacific. It is believed that the first inhabitants were the Atoni people who lived in the mountains were pushed there by the invaders.

Due to the ruggedness of Timor island and the pride of its population to maintain the culture of their ancestors, unique identities that were perpetuated and known in East Timor were namely the Mambae people, Bunak people, Manatuto people and various other distinctive groups.

Villages separated only by a river or a mountain had different cultures therefore different languages.

Tais

The traditional woven cloth called *tais* include patterns that are the written transmission of the tradition of the particular region in which they are made. *Tais* are highly cherished especially in exchange of dowries. Only the locals could interpret the design and the "la finesse" of the artist.

Family life

East Timorese animists practised bigamy and the women called each other sister without animosity. The first wife is *bin bot* (big sister) and the successive wives are the *alinfetons* (younger sisters). Men do the hunting and clear the place for agriculture while women sow seeds, harvest crops and do the home chores such as fetching water and cooking.

In the villages the elderly were ones who possessed the traditions. They were respected by the youth who sought their advice and teachings. A young person would always stand aside on the path in respect for the elderly person to walk pass. Some elderly people lived alone in their huts but were always provided with food by the local youths and their families eager to learn their wisdom and request an interpretation of their dreams or nightmares.

Local matters

In exchange for dowries, parents who normally do not have skills in interpreting the wishes of their counterparts would ask for help from a *'lia nain'*. *Lia nain* is versed at exchanging words and meanings of local traditions to simple everyday language for the interested party. Even in conversation, Timorese use subtle ways of telling things that only the *lia nain* can interpret.

The experience as the *lia nain* is gained in time through learning how to ask for thirty buffaloes of certain sizes of its horn or number of *belaks* (ornamental medallions made of gold). The lia *nain* use metaphors which are frequently difficult to interpret. Like a solicitor, the *lia nain is* an expert in handling the affairs concerning local matters.

Nature

People living on the coast built their canoes with the trunk of *ai bidu* and palm leaves which are arranged according to their own tradition.

Ai bidu is a tree whose trunk is light and easy to work. The name *ai bidu* means *merry-go-round tree.* This name is based on the tree's seeds which Mother Nature provided with two wings. At a distance the seeds swirl around like miniature helicopters once they are separated from the tree and land on faraway grounds for new life.

Legends

East Timorese are very superstitious and very rich in imagination. Every old tree or huge rock with a strange shape has a spirit therefore is *lulic* or sacred. Some springs and lakes have legends about them in the way they came to existence or because they hold something sacred. East Timor is full of legends. The Timor island itself has its own well-known legend of it's originating from a crocodile.

Cockfights

The most admired animals are the rooster because of their courage and perseverance. Cock fights are the national sport. The courage of a man is some times compared with a cock while a coward is called a hen. It was very common to see a mountain man with a cockfighter under his arm carried as a precious entity.

Regional Houses

Houses are of different shapes and sizes. Some houses in the region of Tilomar have roofs that reach the ground. The tall houses common in the eastern part of the country in Lospalos are the most ancient. The conception of this particularly renowned structure is that the roof is reserved to the Gods and spirits of the ancestors, the middle for the living people and the lower part of the house is for nature's spirits which is normally occupied by animals such as goats.

Although East Timor is only a small country, it holds a distinctively unique culture of its own. Like all the countries around the world with their own national heritage and traditions, East Timor is enriched with ancient legends, landmarks and customs. Throughout centuries of colonialism and now, trying to survive a massive repression, the culture of East Timor is a reminder of our identity.

Some common Tetum phrases

Senhor João doben! *Dear João!*

Dona Maria doben! *Dear Maria!*

Senhor Padre doben! *Dear Father!* (to a priest)

Senhora Madre N. doben! *Dear Sister N.*!

Australians need to be careful when using the titles Senhor *and* Dona *before Christian names. Timorese are very formal in such matters. In general, where titles exist they must be used.*

Never use the singular pronoun ó *when writing to a Timorese adult (*Ita *must be used). The plural* imi *('you plural') is always safe.*

Bondia husi rai-Austrália! *Hello from Australia!*

Imi di'ak ka lae? *How are you?*

Ami iha belun Timor-oan barabarak iha ne'e iha Austrália.
We have many Timorese friends here in Australia.

Imi-nia maluk sira naran sa?
What are you family members called?

Iha ema na'in ... iha ami-nia família. Sira naran...
There are ... people in our family. Their names are ...

Imi ami-nia belun doben sira. *You are our dear friends.*

Iha buat ruma imi presiza ne'ebé ami bele haruka ba imi?
Is there something you need that we could send you?

Ami hanoin imi nafatin. *We're always thinking of you.*

Ami harohan ba imi loroloron.
We pray for you each day.

Ami hakarak liu bá Tim6r loron ida.
We hope to come to Timor some day.

Ami la bele bá haree imi iha imi-nia rain, maibé ita halibur bainhira ita hamulak.
We can't visit you in your country, but we are united when we pray.

Ami hakerek aprende lia-tetun. *We want to learn Tetum.*

Ha'u hatene liafuan tetun balu de'it.
I know only a few words of Tetum.

Tuba rai nafatin! *Hang in there! Don't give up hope!*

Haksololc! *Congratulations!*

Rahun di'ak! *Good luck!*

Obrigadu/Maromak sei selu imi. *Thank you.*

Hela ho Maromak. *Goodbye..*

East Timor: A Close-Up

East Timor is our closest Catholic neighbour. After the arrival of the first Aboriginal nomads in Australia thousands of years ago, the earliest foreigners to visit our shores were very probably natives of Timor. This island, after all, the largest in the Lesser Sunday group of the Malay Archipelago, lies just over 400 kilometres off the Northern Territory coast. Among the falsehoods commonly spread abroad about the Maubere is that they are ethnically Malay like the Javanese who now rule them. That they are basically a non-Malay people is evident not only from their physiognomy, but from the Western civilisation they have willingly adopted. Or, as the Timorese chaplain in Sydney puts it: *Indonesios e Timorenses sao como agua e gasolina* "Indonesians and Timorese are like water and petrol": they don't mix.

The natives of Timor are actually of Papuan stock, mingled with later waves of Proto-Malay immigrants from the north-west, and even today they most resemble the inhabitants of New Guinea. Although Papuan vernaculars survive in remote districts, most Timorese speak a Malay-Polynesian (Austronesian) language called Tetum (Tetun, Teto), or one of several related dialects. And while Tetum is ultimately related to Indonesian and Polynesia. In fact the inhabitants of all the south eastern Indonesian islands from Sumba and Flores to West Irian are ethnically and linguistically more Melanesian than Malay. The name *Timor* itself, meaning 'east' in Malay, indicates a peripheral region, 'the eastern island' in relation to Indonesia proper ('East Timor' in Indonesian is the tautological-sounding *Timor Timur).* Significantly, the bulk of Indonesia's Christian minority (2.1%) lives in these ethnically diverse eastern islands.

Sighted by Antonio de Abreu in 1511, Timor's first European settlement was made by three Portuguese Dominicans from Malacca in 1562, and the whole of the island had been conquered by Portugal by 1642. But being rich in sandalwood, it was also coveted by the Dutch, who took the western zone less the then capital Lifau and the surrounding enclave of Oe-Cusse in 1651, and Timor has been politically and culturally divided ever since. (Dutch West Timor became part of the new Republic of Indonesia in 1950; its people are predominantly Protestant, with Catholic and Moslem minorities). Socially, the people of East Timor fall into two broad groupings. The inhabitants of the towns and larger villages are culturally Latinised, speaking both Portuguese and a local language, and devoutly Catholic in faith. Among this group are a few white descendants of Portuguese colonists and the more numerous *Maestros*, or persons of mixed blood. The majority of the indigenous population who inhabit the rugged interior speak no Portuguese. They lead a tribal existence and most of them practise a syncretistic mixture of Catholicism and animism.

Language and cultural identity

Both the misconception that the East Timorese cultures are completely distinct from Indonesian cultures and the misconception that the East Timorese cultures are just sub-cultures of Indonesian-based cultures are based in ignorance of history. Not all German-speaking peoples are happily united in one nation. Instead, they are spread over various nation states, namely Germany, Austria and Switzerland. Similarly, not all Malay-speaking peoples live in Malaysia. They are spread over Malaysia, Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Singapore and Thailand. And if we were to include all the peoples in the world who speak a Malayo-Polynesian - or Austronesian - language, this cultural realm would cover many more independent as well as still-born nation states.

Why then should we deny the fact that there are various strong cultural similarities between the East and the West Timorese, some of whom speak the same Tetum language, originate from the same Belu or Tetum ethnolinguistic group and profess the same Catholic faith? I certainly do not see that as requiring that they should be merged into one nation state, if the peoples of those two parts of the island do not wish that.

Kore Metan

The colour black is worn
On the people of East Timor
This can resemble a relative
Who was fighting and
Struggling for their life...

Traditionally, East Timorese wear black for one year to mourn the death of a relative.

After that year, a party is held to take off the black cloth called "lutu" which is tied around the left arm or pinned on the left chest. The ends the mourning by the relatives.

"Kore metan" is played at the party because the relative has reached heaven where they are now in peace.

> why I am writing, as a leader of the Catholic Church, and as a citizens of Timor, to ask you, as Secretary General, to start in Timor the most normal and democratic process of decolonisation, i.e., the holding of a referendum ... Indonesia says the people of Timor Timur have already chosen integration, but the people of Timor themselves have never said this. Portugal wants time to solve the problem. And we continue to die as a people and a nation.

In sum, according to John Taylor,

> [t]hrough their repeated documentation of human rights abuses, calls for a referendum, and the protection they have given to critics of the occupation, East Timorese clergy have played a crucial role in defending people's rights and publicising the plight of East Timor international.

'Indonisation'

The key difference between the Bishop Lopez and his successor, is the clear emphasis Bishop Belo places on cultural and economic aspects of *integrasi* and the importance of resisting many of these. Bishop Belo uses the term 'Indonisation' to encapsulate the unsavoury aspects of *integrasi:*

> Timorese culture is being stifled ... the Timorese language is not taught in schools, Islam is being actively promoted and there is a growing influx of Indonesian settlers under the policies of 'Indonisation'.

'Indonisation' broadly refers to central government efforts to permanently transform East Timorese culture, and political and economic conditions, thereby more closely integrating it with the rest of Indonesia and curtailing support for secessionist forces.

Source: Michael Salla, *East Timor's Non-Violent Resistance and the Catholic Church.* Paper presented at the *Conference on Religions and Human Dignity: Rights and Responsibilities*, Deakin University, July 1994.



Cardinal Clancy on East Timor

"I think our government should at least show the same concern for human rights, *at least* the same concern for human rights in East Timor, as it shows for the abused human rights in Vietnam or China. Now obviously our government feels confidant that it can discuss these matters in Vietnam and in China, and I'm sure they have the same skills necessary for such discussions with regard to East Timor.

I wouldn't know if the government's general policy of engagement will bring about improvements and that's why it's necessary to have somebody permanently up there monitoring the situation. It certainly hasn't stopped the abuse of human rights and while such abuses continue, then I think it is the responsibility of the government to address the situation."

Taken from an ABC interview - July 1994.

Questions

1. In reference to your study of East Timor, what principles of Catholic Social Teaching seem to be applicable?
2. How has the Catholic Church in East Timor responded to the Indonesian occupation?
3. Has the Church's action been adequate and in accord with its own principles?
4 Evaluate your own actions as well as those of Bishop Belo, Xanana Gusmao, etc.

Activities

1. Invite a speaker from the church to speak on the current crisis (refer to the resources list).
2. Visit a person involved with the Church and find out what the Church's attitude is towards East Timor .
3. Write to a member of the Church expressing your concern with the situation in East Timor and urge continued support for the East Timor's struggle for independence..
4. Contact Church organisations or an NGO (refer to the resources list).
5. Make a poster for the school or Church, depicting your support for the East Timorese.
6. Prepare a Paraliturgy for 12th November Anniversary of the 1991 Santa Cruz Massacre.

TL 2012-4

East Timor:
The religious dimension

Profile of Bishop Belo - Leader of the Catholic Church in East Timor

Bishop Belo is the Apostolic Administrator of the diocese of Dili. As the leader of the Catholic Church in East Timor, he must not only administer the needs of the rapidly growing congregations, but live the daily reality of being the centre of an international territorial dispute. The Vatican's direct administration of the East Timorese Church reflects the unresolved conflict over East Timorese sovereignty. Therefore, while Bishop Belo must live with all the political machinery of the Indonesian State, and carry an Indonesian passport, his diocese is separate from the Indonesian church.



He constantly travels to the towns and villages of East Timor to hear and respond to the needs of his people. He stresses the importance of the Church having a presence to give strength and protection to people who have suffered greatly over the years.

Like all other Timorese, he lives with the constant presence of the Indonesian military forces that continue to dominate the life and landscape of East Timor. He hears the cries of restless, young people and old, who are denied the freedom to develop and express their full humanity. He speaks out for those who have no voice. His message to their brothers and sisters in Australia is one of peace, justice and reconciliation. He speaks of the need to look forward, to prepare leaders for the future, 'who can live and love in justice and peace, who can be a sign of peace amongst their people'.

He was born in Wailakama, a village in Vemasse, Baucau on the 3 February,1948, the fifth child of Domingos Vaz Felipe and Ermelinda Baptita's six children. His father, a school teacher, died when he was two years old. His family had a background of farming and in his childhood, the young Belo developed skills in shepherding water buffaloes in Keikeli, the village of his ancestors.

Belo was sent to missionary school and later graduated from the Seminario de Nossa Senorha de Fatima in Dare in 1973. He then left for Portugal and studied at the Novisiat Salesian in Lisbon. After a brief return to East Timor in 1974 where he taught at the Salesian college at Fatumaca, he returned to Portugal and studied philosophy at the Instituo Superior de Estudos Teologicos de Lisboa for two years and then another three years at the Universidade Catolica Portuguesa. He then went on to Rome, where he studied Pastoral Theology at the Universita Pontificia Salesiana. In March 1981 he returned to East Timor as Director of Fatumaca College, which is located in the district of Baucau, 130km east of Dili. Two years later, the Pope appointed him Apostolic Administrator of the Diocese of Dili, which covers the whole of East Timor.

When he was consecrated a Bishop it was a major event, attended by numerous government and church officials and some 30,000 Timorese Catholics. The ceremony was broadcast nationally on Indonesian television .As leader of the Catholic Church in East Timor, he pushed ahead with programs, to increase the Church's institutional resources, including new schools, seminaries and churches.

Shortened version of an article by Louise Crow, published in *Uniya*, Summer 1993.

The Church and the People

Prisoners

The Church is involved in prison visitation in Dili (prisons at Balide, Becora and Comarco), including visitation of political prisoners. We were unable to obtain the numbers of prisoners or even prisons in East Timor. We were told these are places of detention in every military district. This work is also conducted by the ICRC, to a limited extent because of the restrictions on its activities. Many parishes document the human rights abuses including disappearances, detentions, torture and killings.

Timorese Clergy

There is a clear division in the clergy between (a) the Timorese priests and those foreigners who arrived before the mid 1980s and (b) the more recently arrived, mainly Indonesian priests. IN terms of credibility the numbers of the Timorese priests are much more significant to the vast majority of the population. However, several of these lamented that they could not speak out politically about God, the Church or the poor while pro-integration priests could speak as loudly as they liked about Indonesian nationalism

The Eucharist

There were approximately 3,000 who attended this outdoor ceremony which lasted nearly three hours in the hot Dili sun. Most were young people. They prayed and sang and shared the Eucharist together. The palpable oppression and suffering is in direct proportion to the East Timorese expression of joy and delight at times such as these.

The Church: a Voice for the Voiceless

The Church is one voice of dissent against the military policies practiced in East Timor. While the Indonesian government controls the formal power structures and material resources, the Catholic Church commands the respect of the people. It has become the source of hope and encouragement for the people.

Spirit of Faith

Despite the relentless stories of abuse, there was areal joy in experiencing the brave spirit and faith of the Bishop, priests, nuns and people. The Masses we went to were well always well attended. The week-day Masses in the Bishop's Chapel in Lecidere each morning at 6.00am were full. A mix of old and young, religious and lay, praying and singing in their native language of Tetum - simple, faith filled and devout. Prayer that transcended the boundaries of language and culture.

Young People

For the young East Timorese, who are at the forefront of the fight for justice, the Church is an alternative in East Timor. There is no political alternative to the Indonesian presence, but the Church has provided a place of safety where the East Timorese can gather and celebrate and pray. It has been a place of sanctuary - perhaps the only place that the people have to feel secure - in an other wise tightly controlled society. Although members of the Church may feel unable to publicly speak against the abuses of the Indonesian military, their lives in many cases are devoted to the protection of the Timorese peole.

Extract from CISET's *A Report on a Visit to East Timor*, June 1994

Growth of various religious groups in East Timor from 1974 to 1990

Religion	**Total number of followers**	
	1974	1990
Catholics	220314	676402
Protestants	2550	20660
Confucians	5660	-
Moslems	135	27334
Gentios (Pagans)	460112	-
Hindus	-	3961
Buddhists	-	841
Others	18607	-
Total	668771	747557

The reasons for this rapid growth are: *first*, under the official state ideology of the Pancasila, all Indonesians can only practise one of the five official religions: Islam, Christianity, Judaism, Buddhism, and Hinduism. Nearly all East Timorese that practised animism chose Catholicism since this was the most familiar of the choices available to them, and appeared most compatible with their animist beliefs. *Second*, the Church provided some protection from military excesses during East Timor's brief civil war in 1975 and Indonesia's subsequent military intervention. Priests still play an important intermediary role for many East Timorese who attract the attention of the security forces. Indeed, Bishop Ximenes Belo still opens his home as a sanctuary for East Timorese afraid of being arrested and interrogated. *Third*, the Church has become a means of expressing political defiance due its outspokenness on a number of political, economic and human rights issues. Therefore many are attracted to the Church since it enables them to express their nationalism within a religious framework, and provides the only means of public assembly without running the risk of being arrested. Fourth, the adoption of Tetum as the major liturgical language in the early 1980s, enabled the Church to win over many converts as well as being seen as a defender of East Timorese culture. *Finally*, conversion to Catholicism is a means of emphasising East Timor's different colonial heritage, and an indirect way of scorning the religion practised by nearly 90% of Indonesians-Islam.

Non-violent resistance

The Catholic Church is the pivotal focus for nonviolent resistance to religious, cultural and economic aspects of *integrasi* (the Indonesian term describing East Timor's integration as the 27th province of Indonesia). The nonviolent resistance adopted here is principled insofar as it is based on a rejection of violence as outlined on Biblical precepts and practises. The main goals of the resistance occurring here are, first, criticising human rights abuses by the Indonesian military; second, countering the effects of Indonesian immigration and monopolistic economic practises; third, maintaining East Timor's Catholic heritage in the face of the widespread promotion of Islam; and fourth, the protection of East Timorese culture. The nonviolent methods used here range from Catholic clergy making critical public statements of Indonesian policies, encouraging traditional East Timorese cultural practises, maintaining an East Timorese curricula in church schools, and providing support for spontaneous public protests when Catholicism or East Timorese culture is threatened.

Bishop Martinhu da Costa Lopez

Under the leadership of the acting Bishop of Dili Martinhu da Costa Lopez until 1983, the Catholic Church in East Timor became increasingly outspoken on human rights and political issues. In an interview he explained the reason for this shift:

> [T]here was no-one the people could go to for help except us, and we could do so little. Each time I went to the commander and complained; for years I did this. Maybe it helped for a short while, but really nothing; the military treated us with contempt, so after five years I started to speak out. I spoke in the church against the military. I told them that if they wished to kill me they knew where I was, I was ready for death.

A letter in 1983 by East Timorese priests condemned "moral and physical violence; arbitrary imprisonment ... executions without trial or summary judgement; disappearances and the destruction of families ... hunger and disease throughout all of East Timor. This proved the last straw for the Indonesian military in the face of the Church's increasing politicisation, and led to the forced resignation of Bishop Lopez. His replacement, Carlos Philipe Ximenes Belo was initially viewed with suspicion by the East Timorese clergy, but in time has proved to be no less outspoken than his predecessor on human rights and political issues.

Bishop Belo's leadership

Under the leadership of Bishop Belo, the Catholic Church attempts to pursue a non-political agenda insofar as it avoids statements that make it a partisan actor in the political and military conflict in East Timor. Indeed, Bishop Belo tries to steer a middle course between the uncompromising demands for independence by East Timor's military and Clandestine Front, and the hardline Indonesian generals wishing to eliminate all political dissent.

Bishop Belo tries to steer a middle course between the uncompromising demands for independence by East Timor's military and Clandestine Front, and the hardline Indonesian generals wishing to eliminate all political dissent.

This is reflected in statements which are supportive of *integrasi* yet appeal for greater political autonomy in order to preserve East Timor's unique culture and national identity:

> Give us special status or more autonomy. We have a different history and culture ... I know we're going to be sunk if we live on our own. We don't have skilled workers and infrastructure, that's why we joined Indonesia ... The main thing is, we want to be a little more free, and that is fundamental. Not free from Indonesia, but free as citizens of this unified country.

Nevertheless, Bishop Belo continues to make political statements concerning East Timor's future. The most provocative and inflammatory, from the Indonesian government's point of view, is his call for a referendum to resolve the conflict. In a letter to the United Nations Secretary-General in 1989, he wrote:

> For our part, we, the people of Timor, think that we must be consulted on the future of our land. That is

Responses from around the world

The massacre November 12 by Indonesian security forces of 'dozens' of unarmed mourners at a Catholic cemetery cannot be allowed to pass without a strong denunciation by our government. This is a gross violation of the most fundamental right, that of life itself, and deserves to be denounced as such. (**United States Catholic Conference, 19 November, 1991**)

It appears that human-rights abuses in East Timor have continued to occur following the Santa Cruz massacre on 12 November, 1991.

We have unconfirmed reports that the Indonesian Army has conducted house-to-house searches for people who survived the march to the cemetery. This complements another published claim that all the men in a suburb of Dili had been rounded up.

Meanwhile, General Try Sutrisno, the commander of the Indonesian armed forces, has been quoted as saying that "people who refuse to toe the line will be shot." (**Melbourne *Age*, 20 November 1991**).

Brigadier General Rudolf Warouw, the Indonesian military commander in East Timor, has been quoted as admitting that his troops fired into the crowd of mourners at Santa Cruz cemetery for ten minutes, which he regarded as not "too long a time." (**Melbourne *Age*, 21 November 1991**).

The Catholic bishops of Australia endorse the call made by their Committee for Justice, Development and Peace on 22 November for a credible and independent investigation by the United Nations into the recent tragic killings and other alleged human rights abuses in East Timor...

According to a number of reports reaching us, the atmosphere in East Timor to this day continues to be one of fear and apprehension. Any investigation into the human rights situation there should not be limited to the events of 12 November but should also examine allegations of abuses, including summary executions, disappearances, detentions and other forms of harassment .

This statement is issued on the vigil of 7 December 1991, when Catholics in several parts of Australia will join their East Timorese friends in praying at Mass for the victims of the massacre, for their families and friends and for a just and peaceful solution of the problems in East Timor.

It is an appropriate moment for Australian Catholics to express solidarity with all those who suffer from injustice and persecution anywhere.

In the case of the East Timorese, both geography and history give us especially compelling reasons for such a response.

East Timor is less than an hour away by air from our coastline. Thousands of its people, our near neighbours, died to protect Australian service personnel during the Pacific War, which commenced exactly fifty years ago. We have an unpaid debt to those largely unsung heroes. **(Catholic Bishops of Australia, 6 December, 1991)**

Questions and Activities

1. Invite some East Timorese people to talk about their personal experiences in relation to the abuse of human rights in East Timor.
2. Write down the reasons why young people joined the demonstration which stopped at Dili's Santa Cruz cemetery in November 1991.
   a) What was the response of the Indonesian authorities?
   b) What was the international response to the massacre?
   c) Did the response by the soldiers to the demonstration help solve the conflict in East Timor?
   d) List some important factors that you think would help solve the divisions in East Timor.
3. Read Michelle Turner's Telling - East Timor: Personal Testimonies of Human Rights abuse in East Timor 1942-1992, UNSW Press, Kensington 1992.
4. Design an appropriate way for your class/school/parish to remember the anniversary of the Santa Cruz massacre on November 12, 1991.

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CHRISTIANS IN SOLIDARITY WITH EAST TIMOR

East Timor

EDUCATION KIT

TL2012-5

East Timor:

Massacre at Santa Cruz

Santa Cruz 12th November, 1991

The massacre of scores of young East Timorese at Santa Cruz cemetery on November 12th 1991 was not the first or worst massacre to occur since the Indonesian invasion.

However, it was the first to occur in front of westerners with cameras. The pictures they flashed around the world horrified those who saw them.

It began with the dawn Mass at the Motael church to mourn the death of Sebastiao Gomes, a student shot dead two weeks earlier by Indonesian security forces. As hundreds of East Timorese marched to Sebastiao's grave to lay flowers, many unfurled banners they had prepared for the visit of a Portuguese delegation which had been cancelled. Outside the cemetery, with no warning, troops opened fire on the crowd. Hundreds were killed, wounded or went missing. There are reports of continued killings by the military in the following days.



The response of the Indonesian government was directed more at the international outcry than to the victims and their families. Despite an official Indonesian inquiry, to this day there is still no accurate number of how many were killed, wounded or detained. The sentences of the soldiers convicted of killing the demonstrators were minimal compared to the heavy sentences imposed on those accused of leading the demonstration.

The conditions in East Timor that led to the Santa Cruz massacre have not changed. The new Governor and military commander display and advocate a more rigid intolerance of dissent. The military still control the territory, abuses of human rights continue and the people are restless for a just, free and open society.

A stark iron cross stands in the Santa Cruz cemetery - a memorial to those who were killed. Many people visit to light candles and lay flowers at its base. In remembering their loved ones and the hopes and aspirations they died for, they continue to carry a strong commitment to justice and human dignity.

Eyewitness Accounts

This eyewitness account remembers the day at Santa Cruz. It was given by Amy Goodman for Pax Christi International at the UN Commission on Human Rights in February 1992.

Thank you. Mr Chairman. My name is Amy Goodman. I'm a journalist with Pacifica Radio, a public radio network in the United States. I want to thank Pax Christi for inviting me to speak.

Several months ago I survived a massacre in East Timor carried out by the Indonesian army.

On November 12, thousands of Timorese gathered for a mass commemorating the recent death of a young man killed when soldiers surrounded and shot into the Catholic Church.

After the mass, they marched to the cemetery. As the procession wove its way through the streets of Dili, more and more people joined - from their workplaces, schools and homes. The crowd was defiant, but orderly, with junior high school boys trotting along, putting up the V sign and chanting "Viva", and older boys yelling, "Disciplina! Disciplina!" keeping them in line. And people carried banners; a forbidden act in East Timor. "Indonesia, why you shoot our church"; and "Portugal, we are your responsibility" were among the slogans they carried. By the time the procession reached the cemetery, there were well over three thousand people. Like the funeral two weeks before,

Eyewitness Accounts cont.

things were winding down and this seemed to be the time that everyone would go home; that is, until we saw hundreds of troops marching towards the crowd in formation; machine guns in hand.

At this point, journalist Allan Nairn and I moved to the front of the crowd so that the soldiers would see us. As Westerners with head phones, tape recorder, microphone and camera in full view, we thought the soldiers would be less likely to do anything rash. We were wrong. As the soldiers rounded the corner, twelve to fifteen of them lined up in front of the crowd and without missing a beat began firing into the crowd. Their automatic weapons spraying bullets from right to left and back, mowing everyone down in front of them. The Timorese were trapped. With walled cemeteries on either side, they had nowhere to go. When they saw the soldiers coming, some people started to back up, others began to turn around and run.

A few seconds after the Indonesian soldiers began shooting, other soldiers surrounded me. One grabbed my microphone and shook it in my face, then pushed me onto the ground. Others ripped off my bag and equipment and began kicking me in the sides and stomach, punching me in the face and hitting me with their rifles. At that point, Allan, who was just behind me when the troops had opened fire threw himself over me as I was being beaten, protecting me from further injury. We were then directly behind the line of fire and they just kept beating and kicking Allan in the head and chest and sides until his shirt was drenched in blood.

At one point, Allan's hands and legs went into spasm and he couldn't protect himself anymore. The soldiers continued to beat his head with rifle butts, until they fractured his skull. They then put the M-16s to our heads. We kept shouting we are from America, America. After a few minutes, they dared not to execute us. Instead, they focussed their attention on an old Timorese man next to us whom they beat into a sewer ditch. Every time he picked up his head, a soldier would mercilessly kick it or punch it down with his rifle butt. We kept our heads down and eyes averted, fearing that just our looking in their direction would enrage the soldiers further.

A jeep drove by, and we jumped into it as the driver helped the old man in. No matter how brutally we had been treated, it was nothing compared to what had happened to the Timorese. Bodies were lying everywhere. The soldiers had now moved into the cemetery. As we drove off, we continued to hear gunfire. The jeep was soon flagged down by a young Timorese man and within minutes dozens of terrified people had climbed through the windows, were hanging off the sides and back of the jeep, as the soldiers sealed off the entire neighbourhood around the cemetery, killing people as they went.

We drove to the hospital, where the wounded were crowding in. We saw a teenager shot in the back, another being operated on and a boy with his arm ripped open. People were lying in the hallways. We spoke with religious and medical people, all of whom said they had tried to get into the massacre area to help the wounded, but the soldiers wouldn't let them go. Kamal Bamachaj, a New Zealand student studying in Australia had been in the crowd at the cemetery. He was standing behind us, holding a camera, minutes before the soldiers opened fire. He was shot. The Red Cross jeep that drove him to the hospital was stopped twice by the military and detained. The Indonesian doctor who treated the young man told his family he could have lived through the bullet wounds. It was the loss of blood that killed him. Hours later, when we fled the country, the army was moving from house to house, rounding people up.The Timorese bishop estimates more than 180 people were killed.

The Timorese bishop estimates more than 180 people were killed.

We had originally gone to East Timor to report on the human rights situation before, during and after the visit of the Portuguese delegation. Although their trip was cancelled, we still travelled throughout the countryside, speaking with dozens of Timorese. We heard the same story everywhere. The military had held meetings in each village, warning the people that if anyone spoke with the Portuguese, they would be killed as soon as the delegation left. In addition, the Timorese were told, mass graves had already been dug for their bodies. It was clear that a nationwide death threat had been issued. Before the massacre, East Timor Bishop Belo said the military had repeatedly told the Timorese if they spoke, their families would be killed "to the seventh generation".

We had also been in East Timor the summer of 1990. With this trip over a year later, we found the situation had deteriorated even further. Disappearances, imprisonment and torture had increased dramatically, further terrorising the population. This was the context in which the massacre took place.

Recently, the Indonesian government officially banned the New Yorker correspondent and me from returning to the country. If Indonesia wants to cut down on negative publicity, the answer is not to beat and ban journalists, but to stop the killings, detentions and tortures that have continued even since the November 12 massacre. In addition they should abide by the two UN Security Council resolutions passed after the invasion calling on Indonesia to withdraw from East Timor without delay.

Two Personal Experiences

Antonio

"Antonio" is a young East Timorese man, now 23 and still remembers the Indonesian invasion of his country. His story highlights the lack of opportunities for young East Timorese to contribute in their own society. He also speaks of his deep feelings for the suffering of his people and how it led him to resist Indonesian control. Having survived the 1991 Santa Cruz massacre, he now lives in Australia, but hopes to return to his homeland one day.

My own experience is very, very hard.

After finishing school I drove a car for the bank. I just worked for five months, because I became sick, and then the doctor told me to stop working. Then I just stayed at home for a long time. Every day, every night I kept asking "What about me?" When I looked around I saw the people suffering because of the Indonesians.

My heart told me to do something for my country.

My job involved taking letters from the mountain. I would then photocopy the letters from the mountain to give them to my friends and the other people of East Timor that I knew and whom worked with me. Also, part of my work is to contact young people in other parts of the country.

Then on 28th October, 1991 I got a new job which was to help with the demonstration. We wanted to protest on 28th October 1991 in Motael Church, but we couldn't. Then we changed the date of the demonstration to the 12th November 1991.

On the 12th November, my job was just to look after the line and we marched to the cemetery. At the cemetery, we stood up and prayed for my friend Sebastiao for about one minute. The Indonesian army shot us and we ran to the inside of the cemetery to save ourselves from being shot. Some had been shot, some died, some screamed, some had an arm shot off, legs cut off.

I am a Timorese. I will never give up the struggle for the people of my country which was invaded.

Pedro

"Pedro" is a young East Timorese man, now 24 years old. He talks about his involvement in two demonstrations. On both occasions, troops violently ended the protests, resulting in the loss of life. Pedro, fearing for his life, escaped from East Timor and is now studying in Australia.

I would like to say hello to everyone.

When civil war come up I was five years old. I didn't know what was happening to me and my family. On the 7th December, 1975 Indonesia invaded my country. We went to the hospital to protect ourselves. After that, Indonesia called upon all the refugees who were living in the hospital to come down to the city.

On the 12th February, 1990 I was involved with a group we called OBJECTIL, which means Organisation of East Timor Students and Young People. We were all young people prepared to meet someone from the American Embassy. This person came to visit East Timor. His name was Ambassador John Monjo. I didn't go along to the meeting with some of my other friends because I was late. The Indonesian troops blockaded all places where we held the demonstration, so I ran back to my place.

On the 11th November, 1991 I met my friend in the street at night. He gave me a T-shirt and instructions about 12th November. The next morning, together with my brother, we met some friends in the street and then caught the taxi to church.

After mass we went into the street and then we marched to the cemetery. My job was just to pull anyone back who moved out from the line. When we got to the cemetery I saw troops approaching with guns and one said "Come talk to me." One young man walked to him and the soldier the young man. I ran inside the cemetery. I saw my brother move towards me. The troops began beating us and I got a severe beating about my head, chest and arms. Then they took me to hospital in a truck. Inside the truck they beat me again and again until we arrived at the hospital. I stayed in the hospital for one month.

When I returned home the Indonesian army came to my house every day to pick me up. They asked me many questions but I didn't tell them about my political background.

Amnesty International

Amnesty International reports that "In East Timor a pattern of short term detention, torture and ill treatment of alleged political opponents continues to be reported." Widespread arrests were reported before major events to prevent pro-independence demonstrations. The last week of October, for instance, saw the arrest for short periods of 1,000 people, a staggering figure in a territory Indonesia says is pacified. The arrests, announced by Governor Soares, were just part of a campaign to prevent demonstrations on the first anniversary of the Santa Cruz massacre, which also included the expulsion from Dili of anyone without proper identification cards, house-to-house searches, and a pervasive military presence in the streets.

Short term detentions of suspected dissidents invariably include intensive interrogation. "Forms of torture and ill-treatment include: electrocution; slashing with razor blades and knives, including inside the mouth; beating on the head, shins and torso with fists, batons, iron bars, bottles, rocks and lengths of electric cable; sexual molestation and rape; kicking with heavy military boots; burning with lighted cigarettes; threats and deliberate wounding with firearms; immersion for long periods in fetid water, isolation and sleep deprivation."

The Impact of Integration

As the youngest province in Indonesia, East Timor is struggling hard to develop its economy and society. The development of this economy and society, which only 14 years ago was under colonial rule and has not yet recovered from the trauma of 'the war' to integrate East Timor with the other family members of the Indonesian nation, has not been easy. East Timorese society is still in a state of transition.

Because of this period of trauma the provincial government faces very difficult conditions. In this time of transition the government feels very much that there is a lack of participation by the people in development programs. In addition the people are still very poor or live below the subsistence level, making it difficult for them to participate in the economy. Further, business people have not emerged who can activate development activity.

In this context, at the invitation of the provincial government. Gadjah Mada University, with the support of the Bank of Indonesia, conducted socio-anthropological research into the society of East Timor. The purpose of this research is to understand better the cultural and social problems of East Timorese society which need to be taken fully into account in the planning of social and economic policies and programs.

In summary, the study's findings are that the sources of alienation in East Timor can be traced to two major experiences, namely military conflict and the exclusion of the East Timorese from meaningful political and economic participation. The war, variously referred to as the 'war of integration' or the 'civil war', cost many lives and led to sudden and violent upheaval. The Indonesian takeover in all its dimensions, military, educational, economic and political, was so rapid and violent that the East Timorese were subjected to deep 'trauma' and 'culture shock' from which they have not recovered, says the report. This profoundly negative experience has been compounded by what the study calls and 'overdose' of the military who have maintained a strong and active presence in East Timor and perpetrated human rights abuses thereby contributing to deep feelings of mistrust between the people and the authorities.

The second set of blockages derives from the denial to key groups in traditional East Timorese society of a meaningful role in social, political and economic life. These groups include traditional community leaders, the educated youth and, most importantly, the Catholic Church which, says the study, lacks coercive power and wealth but, unlike the government, 'controls the people'. The strong antipathies which have developed between these sectors and the authorities have been compounded by the insensitivity of 'newcomers' who have taken over key administrative positions and shown no understanding of local culture or practices. Further, outside interests and the military have monopolised East Timor's small modern economy and exploited it like a 'milking cow'. The net result has been the fostering of deep divisions within East Timor and what the study presciently describes, given the Santa Cruz massacre, as 'various social dynamics which are developing very quickly'.

Any doubts about the relevance of the study were totally dispelled by the cold-blooded massacre by the Indonesian military of over 100 East Timorese civilians in Dili on 12 November 1991. The killings shocked everyone, including many in Indonesia, and immediately raised questions about the wider situation. Despite efforts in some quarters to depict the crime as an aberration, it was now indisputably clear to even the crudest apologists that East Timor was beset with fundamental social and political problems and that integration was not the happy marriage Indonesia was portraying it to be. If integration was a success, why had the East Timorese developed such high expectations of the Portuguese/UN visit whose abandonment in the days preceding the massacre had created such tension? After sixteen years of integration, why are a disproportionately large number of Indonesian troops deployed in East Timor still youths? Undeniably, many of these troops were only children in 1975 and have grown up knowing only Indonesia and have in the process benefited from its much-vaunted largesse?

Source: *East Timor: The Impact of Integration*,
An Indonesian Socio-Anthropological Study,
The Gadjah Mada University Research Centre for Village and Regional Development,
Yogyakarta , 1990

Questions and Activities.

1. Debate the question of Indonesia's involvement with East Timor using information from your sheets, newspaper clippings and guest speakers.

2. Research Australia's dealings with Indonesia that involve East Timor e.g. Timor Gap Treaty.

3. The Australian Government is supplying military aid to Indonesia and training their military here ion Australia. Discuss this issue from East Timor's, Australia's and Indonesia's perspective.

TL 2012-6

East Timor

EDUCATION KIT

East Timor:

Indonesian perspectives

Indonesian perspectives

East Timor coverage in the Indonesian media has been markedly greater since the Dili massacre than before it. Newspaper readers, radio listeners and television viewers are now much more aware than they were before 1991 that things are happening there which attract international interest.

But the mainstream media picture of what is going on in East Timor is substantially the same as in earlier years. This is partly because of tight censorship. Censorship of news and views on Timor continues to be tighter than on any other area, with the partial exception of the wealth of the President's family.

... the Joint Declaration on Human Rights issued in June in the name of 52 non-government organisations ... argued that to emphasise "the importance of particularities in cultural values, historical backgrounds and religious differences ... only undermines ... the very universality of human rights".

Readers, listeners and viewers are told that East Timor has developed rapidly, thanks to the enviably generous budgets the territory has had since becoming Indonesia's 27th province in 1976. The message is that dramatic improvements in education, health and infrastructure mean that 400 years of Portuguese neglect are being overcome.

In this picture most East Timorese are well satisfied with the territory's integration into Indonesia. The media acknowledge that dissatisfaction exists, especially among high school graduates, reflecting discrepancies between educational output and employment opportunities. But they maintain that most of the dissatisfied people are sensible enough to realise that Indonesian authority is irreversible - all except a tiny minority of foreign-influenced troublemakers.

However Indonesian media attention to human rights issues has grown markedly in recent years, especially since Indonesia began to prepare for the UN World Conference on Human Rights held in Vienna in June-July.

These preparations generated persistent debate between two versions of human rights. The government for its part elaborated its view that human rights need to be understood in relation to the responsibilities which individuals have to their communities and the cultural traditions in which they live. Its representatives argued forcefully, and now with a new sophistication, that political and civil rights need to be balanced against economic and social rights, and especially the right to development, and that the pressure of outside states to impose human rights conditions on aid must be resisted.

But the Indonesian NGOs concerned with human rights, groups like the long established Legal Aid Institute (LBH) and a range of smaller and newer organisations, have also been able to devise increasingly sophisticated forms of argument.

That was evident in the Joint Declaration on Human Rights issued in June in the name of 52 non government organisations. This Declaration argued that to emphasise "the importance of particularities in cultural values, historical backgrounds and religious differences ... only undermines ... the very universality of human rights".

Indonesia's non-governmental delegation to the Vienna meeting was led by Buyung Nasution, who had founded the Legal Aid Institute in 1970. He had played a prominent role as defence counsel in many political trials, had spent much of the late 1980s studying for a doctorate in law in the Netherlands and had returned to Indonesia in late 1992, resuming his role as a central figure in human rights activity. At the Vienna conference he fashioned co-operative arrangements with human rights NGOs from other ASEAN states.

In December 1992 the Indonesian government announced that a National Commission on Human Rights would be formed. In June 1993 it announced that Ali Said, a former general, Justice Minister and Supreme Court Chairman would head this body.

Since then the government has been embarrassed by its slowness to name the rest of the Commission's membership. A number of Indonesians with credentials in the human rights area have said they are unwilling to be members of the new body, or that they would accept membership only on certain conditions. It has become apparent that people like Buyung Nasution, now head of the Legal Aid Institute once more, and Mulya Lubis, a former head of this Institute who now heads an Institute for the Study of Human Rights, have considerable leverage in this respect.

Attitudes on East Timor

How do Indonesia's human rights organisations view East Timor? Only a small group of radical organisations like INFIGHT (Indonesian Front for the Defence of Human Rights), SKEPHI (Indonesian Network for Forest Conservation) and some student groups see East Timor as a central human rights problem. Some of these have come out in favour of self-determination for East Timor.

However there has been a marked rise in interest in East Timor in the human rights groups as a whole, and indeed in the larger NGO constituency of which they are part. Human rights activists from several groups have developed contacts with East Timorese activists in Java and Bali, and a few of them have established such contacts with supporters of the East Timor cause in the outside world.

A principal argument of these groups is that it is not just in East Timor that there have been gross human rights violations of the kind to which the world media have recently called attention. They point to other massacres which have had less international media attention than they deserved, especially in Aceh in 1989-91, in Lampung in 1989, and in Jakarta's port of Tanjung Priok in 1984. New revelations in October 1993, about the disposal of bodies of unarmed demonstrators who had been shot dead in Tanjung Priok in September 1984, have suggested that massacre was possibly larger than the Dili one.

It is still unusual to find acknowledgment in the Indonesian media that the East Timor issue is an impediment to the implementation of foreign policy initiatives in other areas. But this was recognised explicitly in an unsigned article in the April-May issue of the monthly Sintesis, published by an institute close to the Islamic Intellectuals League ICMI. At that point it had become unlikely that President Soeharto would succeed in securing an invitation to address the Tokyo G7 meeting on behalf of the Non Aligned Movement.

Indonesian awareness of the Timor issue has also grown as a result of the publication of new accounts of what happened in East Timor in 1974-76. One of these was included in a recent authorised biography of Benny Moerdani, by Jusuf Pour, which highlights the importance of clandestine dimensions of the Indonesian campaign to incorporate the territory, and admits that its military side was badly bungled.

In addition General Syafei has inaugurated a new phase in the official historiography of the Timor invasion by drawing attention to the scale of the early fighting. The Yogyakarta daily *Kedaulatan Rakyat* of 26 January 1993 quoted him as saying "ABRI had to cope with Fretilin, which had 17,000 weapons '. The earlier official position, occasionally still reaffirmed, is that it was Indonesian volunteers who supported the Timorese who sought their territory's integration into Indonesia.

A recent poem by the popular song writer Bramantyo, *Kawanku, seorang serdadu* (My friend the soldier) has highlighted the horror of the Timor war.' This also emerges from various papers by George J. Aditjondro, a lecturer in Development Studies at Satya Wacana Christian University in Salatiga, Central Java, who was in East Timor in 1974 as a journalist for the weekly *Tempo* and revisited the territory in June-July 1993. Aditjondro advocates not only self-determination for East Timor but independence."

In Indonesian intellectual circles, and especially among journalists and cultural figures, East Timor is now often referred to in terms of "trauma". That term's connotations include the massacres of 1965-66.

Source: Herb Feith, *The East Timor Issue Since the Capture of Xanana Gusmao*, East Timor Talks Campaign, Dec. 1993

Observations on East Timor

I have already been observing what's been going on in East Timor since 1974, first as a journalist with Tempo magazine, and I was one of the first three Indonesian journalists to enter the territory after the Carnation Revolution. Then, while I was still working with *Tempo*, I kept editing the reports on East Timor and kept my liaison, my contacts with the pro-integration Timorese who were living in Jakarta or who were visiting Jakarta. The *Tempo* magazine can be an evidence of what I've written about on East Timor and whom I have interviewed.

Then, during three occasions studying in the US in 1981-1982, 1987-1989 and 1991-1992, I kept my contacts with the pro-independence Timorese, and while studying at Cornell University I also did my library research. I studied the Congress documents, the Congress hearings about East Timor in 1976 concerning the use of American weapons, and the Congress hearings in 1978-9 in relation to the famine in East Timor.

And then, after the Dili incident, after the 12 November massacre in Dili, I started to put more concerted effort to know more about what's going on in the territory by doing more library research on East Timor - I mean, in the Cornell University library system - including using all kinds of documents including Indonesian parliamentary records, Indonesian popular media, and so, simply not just basically the pro-independence or the pro-Fretilin material.

Finally, after having not been able to visit the territory for 19 years, in July last year I visited the territory for 10 days, travelling from the western-most village of Memo to the eastern most village of Tutuala. Two weeks later, I went to Portugal to attend a conference on East Timor and I collected all the baseline material I could get on East Timor relating to anthropology, to the agriculture, to the ecosystems, to the architecture of East Timor in Portuguese.

If the East Timorese are happy with integration, why does there have to be - according to Indonesian claims - eight battalions of Indonesian troops there? If they're happy with integration, why does there have to be so many intelligence agents in Dili? If they're happy with integration, why does the Indonesian government have to spend so much effort to counter the pro-independence propaganda abroad?

Briefly, I will say that East Timor is an Indonesian colony. There is a lot of development going on in East Timor, but is not development dictated or led by the East Timorese people themselves. Just recently, there still has been a fairly strong opposition against the appointment of Indonesian military man as the district head ... of Viqueque. And if you talk about development in East Timor in the sense of the Indonesian government has pumped in so much money - they say 900 billion rupiah - into East Timor, we should also discount the subsidy paid by the Timorese, first by their lives - especially after one third of the population has died in the course of all these years - and also financially, in terms of the subsidies they have had to pay by getting underrated coffee prices and also by all other monopolies run by Indonesians in East Timor.

When I say one-third of the population has died as a result of war, I mean about 200,000. It is a quite safe figure because in some places more than one-third of the population have disappeared. Most of them have died and some of them have fled abroad living as refugees in Portugal and in Australia. So I'm not only talking about figures or claims by the independence movement but also by people who are not necessarily pro-independence, but are pro-integration.

I'm supporting that claim on the figures of the deaths at the Dili Massacre in 1991 because the figures on 271 victims of the Dili massacre is compiled through intensive and hardworking compilation methods done by the Timorese in East Timor as well as the Timorese living abroad in Portugal. They worked hard to compile those data. They did a lot of cross-checking so that the same name wouldn't appear in two or three different categories; they looked into their village of origin or their district of origin; they looked into their professions. And what is the most important thing is they have the list of names of the 271 people who died, and then the two other categories; those who were wounded and those who are missing.

In contrast to that, all the Indonesian claims have not even been able to put a list of names, have not been able to put faces on the figures - say, for instance, even the Indonesian initial claim of 19 victims. Who are those 19 people? Who are those 19 people who are buried in a collective grave in the Hera cemetery in East Timor? So even these simple, small figures cannot be substantiated by the list of names. While this group in Portugal called Peace is Possible in Portugal, which is supported by the research done by Amnesty and also by Timorese health workers and clergy in East Timor is much more convincing to me, as a researcher and as a lecturer in research methodology.

It started in late 1975 with the killings of four Australian journalists, and after that, Indonesian journalists were also not able to cover the invasion in December 1975. Indonesian journalists were also only allowed to visit places much later, maybe in very controlled manners, to serve the Indonesian propaganda. So that's why most Indonesians do not have a clear picture of what is going on in East Timor, and therefore they have had to rely too much only on the official sources. And my attempt is an attempt to break this, to break through this veil of secrecy.

I think, as an Indonesian citizen, my primary responsibility is to think about and to talk about what we have exerted on other peoples and not only be concerned about what's happening far away from Indonesia, in the Middle East or in the Balkans.

The question of Indonesia and the question of East Timor are two separate things. East Timor was never part of the Indonesia which was proclaimed on 17 August 1945. The Indonesia which was proclaimed at that time was the former Dutch East Indies.

Now concerning Indonesia, I think the only way to keep Indonesia intact is if all the cultures in Indonesia can develop themselves on the same level, on the same platform, and not let certain cultures dominate other cultures, that the centre can dominate the peripheries. Maybe Indonesia, in the future, should move more towards a federalistic pattern and not such a strong centralistic, unitarian state like it is now. If that can be accepted, then I am optimistic about the future of Indonesia. But if our unity is only a unity based on fear and based on exploitation, then Indonesia will face a serious danger of disintegration regardless of whether East Timor existed or not.

Based upon an interview with George Aditjondro, ABC-TV Lateline, March 1994.

George Aditjondro,
Lecturer in Research Methodology, Environment and Social Movements,
Satya Wacana Christian University,
Central Java.

of the Indonesian pro-democracy movement. Another goal is to liaise with supportive Indonesian human rights organisations and pass on information about abuses, detentions or protests in east Timor. While such groups enjoy greater freedom of movement than their peers in East Timor, they are economically dependent on the provincial government and vulnerable to threats to scholarships being cancelled if suspected of 'subversive' behaviour.

Source: Michael Salla, *East Timor's Non-Violent Resistance and the Catholic Church.* Paper presented at the *Conference on Religions and Human Dignity: Rights and Responsibilities*, Deakin University, July 1994.

Executive Council of the Struggle/ Clandestine Front (CEL/FC) - 1994a

Dearest companheiros in the group Solidarity of Australian Christians with Christians in East Timor

We hope with God's blessing that this letter will be welcomed by those of you who are currently committed to the work of solidarity with the Christian People of East Timor, in this Nation so violently humiliated. East Timor is a deeply Christianised Nation, which long ago inherited the Christian doctrine and, in its deep sense of being, lies incubated the spirit in full harmony with the teachings of the Church and practice of Christian values. Your presence in the environment and situation which the Christian People of East Timor are experiencing, is already a testimony of the implementation of basic teachings of the Church according to the Gospel: "Be joyful with those who have joy, and cry with those who cry..." All of us are trying to properly understand what happened with Christ 2,000 years ago and to relate to it; in other words, to share with Him the moments He experienced and relate them to the situation which we are in today. At this point in time, Christ identifies with His Church. And the Church, in turn, identifies with the people who want to convert to Christ in unity with His Father.

All of us, members of CEL/FC, want to convey to you that we understand the notion of solidarity which you use to name your organisation, inspires in us an attitude of respect and trust in regard to the work you will develop in support of the Christian People of East Timor. Hence, we wish to convey to you some references which we believe may be relevant to your study and reflection.

Executive Council of the Struggle/ Clandestine Front (CEL/FC) - 1994b

Dearest members of the group Australian-East Timor Solidarity! Respectful friends of the Maubere struggle!

On behalf of all the guerillas of the National Liberation struggle, on behalf of the martyred people of East Timor and all the Timorese political prisoners unjustly imprisoned in Indonesian prison cells in East Timor, and myself, I wish to greet you with best wishes and to welcome you!

This afternoon, at about 14:00 hours local time, I received the surprising news from my friend, your host, that you are visiting East Timor. He asked me to send you a message, without adding details about the reasons why you are here.

Even though I do not know the objective of your trip, the mere fact that you, our friends, are here, is in itself a clear indication of your interests.

I do not know what to do because of the lack of time, and I do not have words to thank you for your generosity and solidarity, whose warmth invades our spirit and forges our will and determination to resist the tyranny of the occupationists, and to restore peace, freedom and justice for the people of East Timor, universal values for which millions of human beings donated their lives, because for each show of solidarity from you, no matter how small, we shall feel less abandoned then before.

Translations of letters from the CEL/FC.

Questions and Activities

1. Compare the political agenda of the Australian Aborigines and Torres Straight Islanders with the struggle of the East Timorese people for self determination.
2. Undertake a research project based on newspaper reports of the 1975 invasion. Work out what happened from this perspective.
3. Invite guest speakers from one of the following organisations: East Timor Relief Association, Council National Resistance Maubere(CNRM) or East Timor Cultural Centre. Information obtained can added to a current project on Timor.
4. Prepare a class presentation on Xanana Gusmao's role in the East Timorese resistance and fight for self-determination.

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CHRISTIANS IN SOLIDARITY WITH EAST TIMOR

TL 2012-7

East Timor

EDUCATION KIT

East Timor: Organisations and aspirations of the people/resistance

Civil War and the Indonesian Invasion

The "carnation revolution" on April 25 1974 overthrew the Caetano regime in Portugal precipitated the formation of a number of political parties in East Timor as the belated process of decolonisation began. The two most popular parties were the Timorese Democratic Union (UDT) and the Revolutionary Front for the Independence of East Timor (FRETILIN). Only the Timorese Popular Democratic Association (APODETI) which was funded by Indonesia and never had more than 300 supporters - favoured integration with Indonesia. Both UDT and FRETILIN saw independence as their main goal and, although they envisaged different time scales, initially formed a coalition. The coalition eventually collapsed, not so much over irreconcilable policy differences, but in the face of Portugal's weak and ambiguous stance and a sustained campaign of destabilisation by Indonesia.

Concerned by rumours propagated by Jakarta that FRETILIN was infiltrated by communists and was planning a coup, UDT leaders staged a "counter-coup" in early August 1975 by securing control of key installations, stating that they wanted independence but in addition to that, linkage with Portugal. Within days counter measures by FRETILIN led to the outbreak of bitter fighting. With superior numbers and equipment FRETILIN gained control of the colony in just over three weeks. Up to 3,000 died during civil war. Although FRETILIN continued to recognise Portuguese sovereignty, Portugal's refusal to carry on the process of decolonisation made FRETILIN the de facto government.

Indonesia meanwhile carried out military manoeuvres across the border from West Timor which were met with fierce resistance. Although the Indonesian foreign minister, Adam Malik, made a written assurance that Indonesia had no claim on the territory and would stand by East Timor's right to self-determination, his government was preparing for a take over. Worries about the possible adverse international reaction to integration had been assuaged by the positive encouragement of Gough Whitlam, the Australian Prime Minister. In order to maintain the lie that the civil war was still raging, that FRETILIN were responsible for mounting atrocities and that thousands of refugees were fleeing to West Timor, Indonesian troops murdered five Australian television journalists at Balibo. Western governments through their intelligence networks knew the true situation and understood fully what was about to happen. On November 28, in an effort to attract international support as invasion loomed, FRETILIN unilaterally declared independence and proclaimed the Democratic Republic of East Timor.

On 7 December 1975 Indonesia launched an attack by sea and by air on the capital Dili. Hundreds of Timorese and Chinese were gunned down at random in the streets in addition to a number of public executions. Substantial reinforcements quelled the fierce resistance in Dili. On 25 and 26 December landings were made at Liquica and Maubara which led to further mass killings of the population. In February 1976, East Timor's Indonesian appointed Vice-Governor admitted that 60,000 Timorese had been killed since the invasion. As a result of these and ensuing atrocities, entire towns and neighbouring villages abandoned their homes to move to safe areas behind FRETILIN lines. Perhaps as many as half a million people were displaced in the turmoil. By April 1976 there were 32,000 Indonesian troops in East Timor, with another 10,000 in West Timor. On 31 May the Indonesian military convened a "People's Assembly" - the 28 delegates of this unelected body approved a petition calling for integration. On 17 July President Suharto signed a bill integrating East Timor as Indonesia's 27th province.

War and resistance

Despite their vastly superior resources, in these early months the Indonesian forces suffered high casualties and only gained control of the coastal and border areas. Indonesia's acquisition after 1977 of counterinsurgency aircraft was the lynchpin of its campaign of encirclement and annihilation. The US Government supplied the most important aircraft (OV 10-Broncos, F5s and A4s) as well as transport planes, armoured cars and a huge quantity of rifles, machine-guns and communications equipment. Indonesia also bought Sabres from Malaysia, Alouette helicopters from France and Hawk trainer-fighters from the UK. Mountain areas where the population had fled were bombed intensively, preventing the people from growing food to support themselves. Famine compounded the effects of injury, disease and displacement. In 1978 and 1979 thousands of East Timorese left the mountains. Whole communities were forcibly split up and moved to "strategic villages" . The situation was compared with Biafra during the Nigerian civil war by relief workers who were allowed to take part in the limited relief operation. 200,000 out of an initial population of 700,000 were estimated to have died .

By 1979 Indonesia had gained control over the whole country and believed that FRETILIN had been defeated - almost the entire leadership had been killed or captured. In the east trough a handful of guerrillas had survived and regrouped under the leadership of Xanana Gusmao. In 1980 resistance was recommenced with smaller units fighting a classical defensive guerrilla war. Without any external material support. Falintil survived renewed military operations against them in 1981,1983, 1984, 1986-1987, 1988 and 1990, and successfully forged links with people in the strategic settlements as well as in Dili and other towns.

Despite a ceasefire in 1983 when the military commander met Xanana Gusmao, the Indonesian military applied unyielding repression. They conscripted civilians to walk in front of advancing troops in so-called "fence of legs" operations to flush out the guerrillas. Surveillance was intense and those suspected of aiding the resistance received brutal treatment. Those who surrendered were frequently executed on the spot and on several occasions hundreds of civilians were massacred in cold blood. Numerous cases of murder, "disappearance", rape and political imprisonment have been documented.

March 1993

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UN talks and the capture of Xanana Gusmao

In the light of the Santa Cruz massacre and the United Nation's increasing role in resolving conflicts around the world, it was difficult to ignore the illegality of Indonesia's annexation of East Timor. Preliminary negotiations between Indonesia and Portugal laid the ground for full talks at the UN in New York starting on 17n December 1992 which were to pave the way for East Timorese participation in "proximity talks". Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali was thought to be moving towards consulting Timorese leaders, especially Xanana Gusmao and Bishop Belo, the leader of the East Timorese Catholic Church.

However, before the New York talks took place, Xanana Gusmao was captured by the Indonesian security forces on 20 November in a Dili suburb. Subsequently, several members of his family and friends with whom he had been staying were also arrested. Clandestine organisations were forced to publicly disband and the military falsely claimed that many of the resistance had surrendered. Xanana himself was paraded on television a series of interviews in which he renounced his struggle for independence and asserted that East Timor was part of Indonesia. This apparent change of heart was so abrupt that many observer, including Bishop Belo, felt that it was evidence of coercion and/or torture. Despite international calls for Xanana's release, he was charged with "rebellion' conspiracy and trying to set up a separate state" and also with "illegal possession of a firearm". The former is punishable up to life imprisonment, the latter by death. His trial began in February 1993. Although the Timorese is more than Xanana alone, his capture was definitely a setback. The New York talks were unfruitful, yielding nothing more than an agreement to meet again in Rome this April. The Indonesian line was once more that there was nothing to discuss, since the East Timorese had expressed their desire to become Indonesians by the vote of the "People's Assembly". Although the General-Secretary is believed to be sympathetic to the plight of the East Timorese, he has kept his criticisms of Indonesia private - severely critical reports such as that of Special Rapporteur Amos Wako, who visited East Timor in February 1992 have still not been published. In these circumstance, talks between the Portuguese and Indonesians may well come to yet another stand-still.

Arrests, torture, killings and disappearances are commonplace again. Until the East Timorese are allowed to make a meaningful choice of self-determination, there can be no internationally acceptable solution to the problem of East Timor.

East Timor's Political Opposition - the Clandestine Front

The 'Clandestine Front' (*Frente Clandestine*) is a term used by East Timorese to describe political resistance to integration with Indonesia, and support for an independent East Timor. It is non-violent insofar as a deliberate effort is made to avoid armed force in the protests, demonstrations and further activities organised by the Clandestine Front. This strategy is deemed to be the most effective in gaining domestic and international support for the goals of the resistance. This form of non-violent action can thus be classified as 'pragmatic non-violence' due to its instrumental nature and lack of commitment to non-violence as a life style principle. Much of the Clandestine Front is centrally run and organised by Falantil (the East Timorese guerrilla army). However, an appreciable part of the Front comprises a collection of individuals or groups with no formal association with Falantil. They may simply view themselves as part of no formal movement that seeks to further East Timorese self-determination.

First branch

East Timor's Clandestine Front has three distinct branches. The first maintains clear lines of communication with Falantil and coordinates the non-violent resistance with it. It is hierarchically organised; its Secretary, Larnan Sabalae, together with Konis Santana, current head of Falantil (the East Timorese guerilla army) and Jose Ramos Horta, form the trioka of leadership the National Council of Maubere Resistance (CNRM). This branch of the Front fulfils two functions. The first is to relay information Falantil and externally based Timorese groups in Portugal, Australia and the rest of the international community. Thus regular reports of clashes, casualties, Indonesian troop movements, and military repression of the civilian population reach the media and communication sectors of CNRM for distribution to the international community. A second function is to coordinate the activities of politically active East Timorese individuals and organisations. In 1991, an Executive Committee was formed in order to achieve this. This branch of the front was responsible for initiating the demonstration at Santa Cruz cemetery.

Second branch

The second branch of the Clandestine Front is clandestine only insofar as its organisational structure, leadership and links with Falantil remain hidden. It comprises politically active students and youths that organise or participate in demonstrations and protests when foreign dignitaries and international media representatives visit East Timor, or who contact foreign tourists and relate stories of human rights abuses by the military and appeal for international support for their struggle of self-determination. Indeed, while in East Timor I was often approached by East Timorese who, while not claiming to belong to the Clandestine Front, appeared to be part of a wider political movement that disseminates information about human rights abuses and to proclaim East Timorese political aspirations. Since the demonstration at Santa Cruz this part of the Front was especially hard hit by the military crackdown on protesters, organisers and other known dissidents. It suffered losses not only as a result of deaths at Santa Cruz, but also due to arrests and others going underground. Despite these losses, there have continued to be a number of organised political activities that have occurred. These include the following:

- *March 17, 1992* - youths demonstrated in Dili against the Navy's blocking of the Portuguese peace ship, Lusitania Express.
- *June 6* - Portuguese flags are raised on the national day of Portugal at Santa Cruz cemetery and at Patu Hai (where further deaths were reported to have occurred).
- *April 7, 1993* - a demonstration outside the residence of Bishop Belo occurred after the capture of Xanana Gusmao's replacement, Ma' Huno.
- *June 22* - a demonstration of 40 East Timorese outside the Dili Cathedral after a mass by the Papal Ambassador, Pietro Sambi. Of the 28 demonstrators detained, 26 were released shortly afterwards due to the Ambassador's intervention.
- *July 17* - a flag protest involving the banned Fretilin flag.
- *September 9* - a demonstration of between 100 and 200 people occurs in Dili due to the visit of US Congress delegates. On this occasion, 53 arrests were made.
- *April 14, 1994* - a small group of East Timorese stage a protest outside the hotel where Western media representatives were staying. The protesters chanted "Long live East Timor" and disappear when security forces appeared on the scene.
- *April 15* - a small group of protesters shout pro-independence slogans outside Motael Church for the benefit of Western media representatives. Later that day the representatives visit Becora jail and a few prisoners shout slogans and protest about their treatment.

Those parts of the Front formally associated with Falantil have a cell like structure where a designated member of a small group has contact with one other group contact person. This was evidenced during an aborted attempt by the author to interview a member of the military resistance. Such a structure is intended to minimise the risk of exposing others in the resistance in cast an individual or an entire group is captured.

Third branch

The third branch of the Clandestine Front is found in Indonesian universities where hundreds of East Timorese are enrolled, e.g., in Jakarta, Bandung and Denpassar. One group which currently operates is based at Satyawacana Christian University, the East Timorese Students' Association (IMPLETIM). A group which has had to go underground is the National Resistance of East Timorese Students (Resistencia Nacional Dos Estudantes de Timor Leste: RENETIL). On May 20, 1994 the secretary of RENETIL, Jose Antonio Neves was arrested in Jakarta for attempting to forward correspondence from Konis Santana.

One of the goals of this branch of the Front is to have political issues associated with East Timor more prominently debated in Indonesian society and included on the agenda

Australia

Australia's stance on East Timor has been somewhat contradictory in the last year. Our decision to vote in favour of the anti-Indonesian resolution at the February-March meeting of the UN Commission on Human Rights suggested that we might be following the Clinton administration's lead on Timor policy. But in recent months that disposition seems to have been eclipsed by the government's strategies for Asian Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC), specifically by the importance Prime Minister Keating has attached to securing active Indonesian co-operation for his design of how APEC should work.

When the Prime Minister was in Washington in September he urged President Clinton to be more "balanced" in his human rights posture towards China and Indonesia. His remarks were received enthusiastically in Jakarta, where Research and Technology Minister Habibie described them as "music in our ears", with Foreign Minister Alatas praising the Prime Minister's "moral fibre".

By contrast Mr Keating's remarks were condemned in much of the Australian media. One sharply critical response, by a group of 43 Australian media celebrities, authors, bishops, professors and others, is appended to this submission. The populist version of the criticism came in National Party Senator Julian McGauran's address to demonstrators on the anniversary of the Dili massacre: "hard hearts and greasy hands".

Prime Minister Keating responded crossly to pro-East Timorese demonstrators when he visited Ireland later in September, saying that East Timor's sovereignty had been an issue in the 1970s but was that no longer. He also dismissed the position of Portugal on the issue, declaring that the Portuguese had been the world's worst colonial rulers.

On the other hand Mr Keating seems to have steered more of a middle path on the Timor issue when visiting Jakarta briefly in October. He again distinguished the Australian position on human rights issues from the more confrontative American one. But he reportedly referred to human rights when he said that Washington would expect something in return for being subjected to the disciplines of a multilateral structure like APEC.

Australians continue to await the outcome of the World Court's hearing of Portugal's challenge to Australia's signature of the Timor Gap Treaty with Indonesia of 1989. Meanwhile a case against that signature was brought before the High Court of Australia in June 1993. Proceedings against this case are to begin in August 1994.

Public concern

Overall, international pressure on Indonesia has remained at a high level in the third year after the Dili massacre. If Indonesian government leaders hoped that the passing of time would lead to a slackening of overseas criticism of their country's role in East Timor, that hope has not been fulfilled.

Source: Herb Feith, *The East Timor Issue Since the Capture of Xanana Gusmao*, East Timor Talks Campaign, Dec. 1993.

* * *

Questions and Activities

1 a) What has been the UN's response to East Timor?
  b) Has it been effective in settling the conflict?
2. What steps have been taken in recent years to resolve the situation in East Timor?
3. View the video "Death of a Nation". Discuss Australia's, the US's and Britain's role in the ongoing conflict in East Timor.
4. Given the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, in what way are the East Timorese peoples' rights not being respected.
5. You have been asked to give a report to the UN. Compile your report explaining the international significance of the issue.
6. Write a letter to the Federal Government of Australia using significant points from your report to the UN.
7. Role playing or being part of a 'hypothetical': students take the roles of e.g. an Indonesian government official, a Portuguese government official, an Australian journalist, an Australian politician, an East Timorese freedom fighter, Xanana Gusmao, the Catholic Bishop of East Timor, Bishop Belo or an Indonesian General. All meet to discuss a settlement to the East Timor question.

TL2012-8

East Timor:
International relations

The United Nations and international relations

The United Nations

In 1975, the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution, reaffirmed year after year, recognising the right of the East Timorese people to self-determination and calling on Indonesia to withdraw "without delay its forces from the territory." Gradually, support for East Timor at the UN declined. In 1982, a relatively weak resolution was passed at the UN General Assembly, which asked the Secretary-General to "initiate consultations with all parties directly concerned" in view of finding "avenues for achieving a comprehensive settlement of the problem". Very little was done by the international community to secure Indonesia's compliance to the UN resolutions.

Various events in East Timor since 1989 - the student demonstrations during the 1989 visit of the Pope, the 1991 planned visit of the Portuguese parliamentary delegation, and particularly, the Santa Cruz massacre on 12 November 1991 - combined to overcome East Timor's isolation. "Witnessed by foreign journalists, the Santa Cruz massacre provided indisputable evidence of Indonesian atrocities in East Timor," sparking worldwide condemnations from governments and non-governmental organisations around the world.

The issue of East Timor was the focus of several interventions during the 48th Session of the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR). Particular attention was given to the massacre. The Commission opted to adopt the chairman's consensus statement, instead of a resolution, which registered serious concern over the human rights situation in East Timor and obtained Indonesia's commitment to facilitate access to East Timor by humanitarian and human rights organisations.

The 49th Session of the UN Commission on Human Rights adopted a strongly worded resolution, asking Indonesia to account fully for all the people killed during the massacre, along with all of those still missing. The resolution also asked Indonesia to treat all the East Timorese in custody in accordance with international humanitarian law. Indonesia has failed to answer key questions about the Santa Cruz massacre.

In a rare move, the Commission asked Indonesia to invite four UN special rapporteurs and working groups interested in investigating the incidence of torture, amongst other issues, to visit East Timor.

A few months later, the UN Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities passed another resolution on East Timor in August 1993, urging Indonesia to comply with the resolutions of the UNCHR. Indonesia moved very slowly on these recommendations.

Even when access is granted, the Indonesian military and police make it impossible for missions to obtain information freely from the people.

Australia

In Australia, there was widespread opposition to the Indonesian invasion. Successive governments, however, apart from some symbolic gestures meant to allay public opinion, considered the problem of East Timor as secondary to their overall South-East Asia policy which, since the end of the 1960s, aimed at more intensive relations with the majority of South-East Asian countries.

Prime Minister Whitlam (Labor Party) declared on 24 September 1974, during a state visit to Indonesia, that an independent Timor would be "an unviable state and a potential threat to the area". The Liberal-National Party coalition, which came to power after the dismissal of the Labor Party in a constitutional crisis in 1975, recognised East Timor de facto as part of Indonesia in 1978. It was only to please the Australian people that the Australian government voted in favour of the United Nations resolution (December 1975) which recognised the right of the people of East Timor to self-determination, freedom and independence. At the same time, however, they abstained with regard to the paragraph which deplored Indonesia's military intervention. A perceptible change occurred from 1976 onwards. Radio transmitters, operating from Australia, which were

U.N. contact with East Timor were confiscated. The Guicciardi U.N. mission met with little cooperation on the part of the Australian government. Until June 1984, FRETILIN leaders were refused an

Australia cont.

Australian visa. Australia abstained from voting in the United Nations until 1978 when it started voting against the U.N. resolutions on East Timor. In early 1979, Australia opened negotiations with Indonesia over the issue of the Straits between Timor and Australia, thus admitting de facto its recognition of East Timor as part of Indonesian territory.

The re-election of a Labor Government in March 1983 brought little change. Prime Minister Hawke backed away from his party's policy, which demanded "de-recognition" of the incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia, when he told Indonesia's Suharto that it was regrettable that the Timorese had not been given self-determination, adding: "That was in the past... we must now look to the future. That's what the interests of Australia and Indonesia require. This is a country of 150 million people and there is no country so important to us... strategically, economically and in other ways. It would be grossly irresponsible for my government not to address itself constructively to those questions". Efforts of the centre-left wing during the party's National Conference in July 1984, to push through a resolution effectively demanding that the Labor government reverse the decision of the previous Liberal government recognising East Timor as part of Indonesia and demanding that the government press for an internationally acceptable act of self-determination to enable the East Timorese to choose their own future, including independence if they wanted it, failed.

In 1989 Gareth Evans, Australian Foreign Minister, and the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Ali Alitas, toasted each other with champagne flying above the Timor Gap, having just signed a treaty that allowed Australian companies to drill for oil and gas.

Exploration in October 1994 has confirmed that rich deposits of oil in the Timor Sea is reported to be equal or greater than deposits in the Bass Straits.

Canada

Canada, which had consistently abstained or opposed U.N. resolutions on East Timor from 1975 to 1982, lobbied actively for the consensus statement at the 48th United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) session. But at the 49th session, Canada attempted to block the passing of a resolution, preferring instead another consensus statement. Then it decided, at the last minute, to co-sponsor the resolution. This shift in Canada's position towards the East Timor issue, although clearly with great caution, is a small but welcome development.

The United States

The attitude of the U.S. government towards East Timor was of major importance for Indonesia. This as well as diplomatic support for Indonesia's East Timor policy. During the invasion it became clear that the weapons produced in Indonesia were of a very poor quality and for this reason US arms supplies to Indonesia were extremely important. Government officials have admitted that the invasion was carried out using roughly 90 % US equipment and that the operation could not have been conducted without American weapons.

An American spokesman declared before the House Sub-Committee on Foreign Operations that Indonesia had become increasingly concerned by the potential for instability in its eastern region and by Fretilin's ideological orientation, due to the fact that Portugal was unable to control the situation because of the civil war between Fretilin and UDT, and against the background of the fall of Saigon and Phnom Penh earlier in the same year. The American government in no way questioned the Indonesian invasion. According to State Department legal adviser Aldrich, this did not represent a legal judgement or endorsement of what took place. "It was, simply, the judgement of those responsible for our policy in the area that the integration was an accomplished fact, that the realities of the situation would not be changed by our opposition to what had occurred, and that such a policy would not serve our best interest in the light of the importance of our relations with Indonesia." In the UN Security Council, the U.S. voted in favour of resolution 384 in 1975, but abstained in 1976. In the UN General Assembly, the U.S. has always voted against resolutions on East Timor, at least after the "formal integration".

Changing emphasis

The plight of East Timor has nagged at American consciences since 1975, when Indonesia devoured this former Portuguese colony. The United States has never recognised Jakarta's annexation of its tiny neighbour but until recently Washington was loath to offend a powerful authoritarian regime that was an important customer for US arms.

Creditably, the Clinton Administration is making amends, spurred by an international outcry over the mass killings of unarmed East Timorese protesters in November 1991. Earlier this year, the US for the first time joined in favouring a United Nations inquiry into Indonesia's human rights abuses. Now, the Administration support, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has unanimously approved an amendment to condition the sale and transfer of US arms to Indonesia on improvement in human rights conditions in East Timor

First Bill Clinton, reversing Reagan-Bush policy, joined a tough resolution in the United Nations criticising Indonesia on human rights. Then, at the G-7 Summit this week, President Clinton used a meeting on the subject of development that President Suharto had requested to talk about human rights violations in East Timor as well. These are modest but necessary steps to hold Indonesia to account for its theft of East Timor's independence. President Suharto grabbed the territory just as it was breaking out of a disappearing Portuguese empire in 1975 and has been repressing a popular nationalist movement ever since. Most recently Indonesia gave a life sentence to the captured leader of the Timorese resistance after a trial that Lisbon denounced as farcical and illegitimate. "The Jakarta government should be the one to be tried for what it has done in East Timor," an official statement said. The Indonesian authorities are not pleased to he rebuked for a colonial policy in East Timor. As a market of 185 million people, as the largest Muslim state and as a "moderate" leader in development, Third World politics and regional affairs, Indonesia ordinarily evades the heavy criticism this part of its policy deserves. President Suharto has profited substantially from Western favour, including American favour, since his accession in 1965 in the wake of a massive slaughter of local Communists.

The Washington Post, Friday, July 9, 1993

International Pressure on Indonesia over East Timor

One major event focusing attention on Indonesia's policies in East Timor was the February-March 1993 meeting of the UN Commission on Human Rights in Geneva. A year earlier, at the preceding UN-CHR meeting, the Dili massacre had been discussed at length, but Indonesia had evaded outright censure. The outcome had been a Consensus Statement by the chairperson, deploring the massacre and calling on Indonesia to "improve the human rights situation in East Timor" and "facilitate access to East Timor for human rights organisations."

The 1993 meeting was more critical of Indonesia. A resolution adopted by 23 votes to 12 (with 15 abstentions) criticised many aspects of the Indonesian government's response to the Dili massacre, expressed "deep concern" at reports of continuing human rights abuses in East Timor, and asked Jakarta to invite four special rapporteurs and working groups to visit the territory, specialists in torture, extrajudicial execution, arbitrary detention and disappearances.

Interestingly, Australia, which had so often lobbied for Indonesia on East Timor issues in previous years, voted in support of the resolution. Japan, which had voted against most earlier resolutions critical of Indonesia, abstained.

Clinton Administration

In early July 1993 President Soeharto visited Tokyo briefly on the eve of the G7 summit meeting. Soeharto had asked to address one of the sessions of the G7 meeting in his role as Chairman of the NonAligned Movement. When this was declined he agreed to visit Japan to convey the Movement's concerns to the G7 meeting's chairman Prime Minister Miyazawa.

While in Tokyo President Soeharto also met President Clinton and East Timor was an important part of their 40-minute discussion. President Clinton passed onto his Indonesian counterpart a letter from 43 US senators urging him to facilitate "serious negotiations ... in pursuit of the self-determination of the East Timorese people". On his way back to Jakarta Soeharto, speaking to Indonesia's private television channel RCTI, expressed anger about the East Timor part of the discussion.

Another dimension of Indonesia's relations with the US had come under pressure in June with an announcement by the US Trade Representative, Mickey Kantor, that Indonesian labor practices would be reviewed by his office, with a view to deciding whether Indonesia should continue to enjoy trade benefits under the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) program. Indonesia was given till February 1994 to demonstrate progress in upholding labor rights, especially freedom of association. The threatened penalty for failing to satisfy the US in this respect was an estimated US$800 million p.a. in exports granted access to the American market.

On 23 July the US State Department announced that it would not permit Jordan to sell four USmade F5 jet fighters to Indonesia, because of "the combination of a number of sensitive issues...including human rights concerns in Indonesia". This was reportedly a response to a letter from two Senators active on the East Timor issue. One of them was Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman, Claiborne Pell, who had been refused permission to enter East Timor when he had visited Indonesia in 1992.

On 8 September the Foreign Relations Committee of the US Congress adopted an amendment to the Foreign Aid Authorisation Bill which effectively threatened Indonesia's ability to acquire American weapons. This Feingold amendment, adopted unanimously, called for the President to consider human rights criteria in consultation with Congress before approving any arms sales or transfers. It specifically asked him to consider whether Indonesia was bringing to justice "all military personnel who were responsible for ordering, authorising or initiating the use of lethal force against demonstrators in East Timor in November 1991".

Several weeks later it became clear that the Foreign Aid Authorisation Bill would not be passed, which has been usual in recent years. So, to Jakarta's relief, the Feingold amendment did not become law. But Congressional pressure was maintained, with the signature by 37 Senators and 101 members of the House of Representatives of letters asking the President to take up the East Timor issue with President Soeharto at the APEC meeting in Seattle.

and protection of the environment, voluntary resettlement of displaced persons, district development projects, women and children care and public health and immunisation programs.

- Restoration of all basic human rights in the territory, including freedom of political activities and assemble.

- Removal of any restrictions on the use and teaching of Portuguese and Tetum languages.

- Setting up of an independent Human Rights Commission in Dili.

- Appointment of a Resident Representative of the UN Secretary General in East Timor, responsible for the implementation of all UN activities in the territory and for reporting on the implementation of the accords.

At the end of phase one, the following results should be achievable:

- Normalisation of Portugal - Indonesia relations.

- Legal existence of East Timorese political parties.

- Establishment of a resident European Community Legation in Dili, representing Portugal in East Timor.

- Setting up of a Portuguese Cultural Institute in the territory.

Phase Two - five years

This is a transition stage of autonomy in which East Timorese would govern themselves democratically through their own local institutions. This would require:

- Election of a local Assembly with a five-year mandate, according to universally accepted democratic norms under UN supervision and technical assistance. Only East Timorese duly identified as such may vote and be elected.

- Election of an East Timorese Governor, for a five-year term by the Assembly .

- Powers devolved to the East Timor Assembly to include legislation concerning international trade relations, investment, property, immigration and others.

- Withdrawal of remaining Indonesian troops and further reduction in Indonesian civil servants.

- Placement under the command of the elected governor of a territorial police force organised by the UN. The territory is to have no army.

Phase two may be extended by mutual consent between Indonesia and the East Timorese population. A 2/3 vote by the Assembly would be required for a proposal for the extension of phase two to be put to a popular referendum.

If the referendum rejects extension of phase two, or at the end of an extension of phase two, phase three would commence.

Phase Three - Self -determination

This phase covers:

- Preparation for a self-determination referendum, to be held within one year of the commencement of phase three, whereby the population may choose between independence, free association with, or, integration into Indonesia.

In the case of independence being chosen, the following would take place:

- Election of a Constituent Assembly, and adoption of a Constitution for East Timor.

- Election of a government of East Timor, and transfer of sovereign powers to this Government of National Unity.

- East Timor applies for United Nations membership.

- Declaration of East Timor as a Zone of Peace and of Neutrality, guaranteed by the Permanent Members of the UN Security Council and ASEAN.

- East Timor accedes to and ratifies all international human rights instruments.

- East Timor applies to join ASEAN and the South Pacific Forum.

CNRM, November 1993.

TL2012-9

East Timor

EDUCATION KIT

East Timor:

Search for a settlement

The search for a settlement

Indonesian-Portuguese talks on East Timor, mandated by the UN General Assembly in 1982, were broken off shortly before the Dili massacre and resumed in September 1992. Since then there havebeen three further rounds of meetings of the Indonesian and Portuguese Foreign Ministers with UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, in New York in December 1992, in Rome in April 1993 and in New York again in September 1993.

Not much has been disclosed about what was discussed at these meetings and what their outcomes were. After the December 1992 meeting the Portuguese Foreign Minister stated that the two parties' positions were 180 degrees apart. But there seems to have been more progress at the next two meetings.

Portugal has reportedly been seeking to have representative East Timorese involved in the talks, and to have a UN presence established in East Timor. Indonesia has resisted these proposals.

One point on which agreement was reached at the May 1993 meeting was that there should be confidence building measures and exchanges of journalists.

In advance of the September 1993 meeting US Secretary of State Christopher wrote to the two Foreign Ministers, urging them to do more to reach agreement. After that meeting Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali issued a statement on its outcome which refers to seven areas in which the parties would continue to seek agreement.

The meeting's decision that the next meeting of the series would be held in May 1994 suggested to some observers that the process is losing steam. But progress could come before May 1994 as a result of the foreshadowed meetings of the Indonesian and Portuguese Permanent Representatives at the UN with Boutros-Ghali's East Timor representative, the Peruvian Alvaro de Soto.

Settlement proposals

From the Timorese side two main settlement proposals can be said to be on the table. One of these is the CNRM's proposal presented by Jose Ramos Horta in April 1992 when he addressed the Human Rights Sub-Committee of the European Parliament.

This proposal calls for a ceasefire, followed by the immediate release of all political prisoners. After that Indonesia would reduce its troops in East Timor to 1000 within two years and allow several UN agencies to operate there.

Following this two-year period the government of the territory would be accountable to an elected provincial assembly, with Indonesia retaining sovereignty and control of foreign policy. A referendum, with independence one option, would be held after either five or ten years of this arrangement, so either seven or twelve years after the ceasefire. Indonesia would have the option of making the initial five-year period into a ten-year one.

A second Timorese proposal put forward by Bishop Belo in February 1993 is less fully elaborated. It calls for a "special status" for East Timor, involving autonomy which would begin with the cultural and religious fields and then extend to the economic and financial ones. Belo's position on the Lopes da Cruz proposal for reconciliation talks premised on the acceptance of Indonesian sovereignty - that there is no point in talks in which "Ramos Horta and his colleagues did not take part"- suggests that he sees the CNRM as an essential component of any durable settlement.

The Bishop speaks of "the human right(s) of self-determination" and has repeatedly confirmed the position he took in February 1989 in writing to the UN Secretary-General about the need for a UN conducted referendum on the future of East Timor. He has quoted Puerto Rico's position in relation to the USA and the positions of Madeira and the Azores in relation to Portugal as possible models for East Timor's relationship to Indonesia. But it is not clear whether his support for autonomy arrangements of this kind is as a short-term (pre-referendum) possibility or as a long-term one.

Are there grounds for believing that the Indonesian government is likely to take proposals like these seriously?

Those who answer this question in the affirmative usually argue that President Soeharto wants to improve Indonesia's standing in the outside world and to do away with the embarrassment which the Timor issue persistently creates. Some of them add that the President has recently achieved a higher level of ascendancy over the Indonesian armed forces (ABRI), and is therefore better placed to make concessions to the outside world on East Timor

Tension between the President and ABRI was very high in the months before the March 1993 meeting of the People's Consultative Assembly. The former Armed Forces Commander, Try Sutrisno, was elevated to the Vice-Presidency at that meeting Assembly, a victory for ABRI. But the military were clear losers in the composition of the cabinet formed after the meeting. The dropping of General Benny Moerdani from the cabinet was seen as especially important in this regard, as was the fact that four portfolios went to associates of Research Minister B.J. Habibie. Dr. Habibie, chairman of the Islamic Intellectuals League ICMI, and long an opponent of military influence in the government, is now often described as the No 2 man in the Soeharto government.

Soeharto's ascendancy over ABRI was further confirmed at the congress of the government party Golkar in October, when the President's preferred candidate, the civilian Information Minister Harmoko, was elected chairman.

Those who believe that President Soeharto has been preparing the ground for a major change in his East Timor policies were heartened when the President told the media on 9 July that Indonesia had only agreed to incorporate East Timor because the East Timorese had invited it to. This was little more than a repetition of a remark a spokesperson attributed to him in February 1992. But it may be significant that he spoke to the media directly on this second occasion.

A recent series of transfers of army officers loyal to Benny Moerdani is widely seen as increasing Soeharto's personal control over the army, and have been interpreted as suggesting that Soeharto is preparing the ground for major changes in Timor policy.

On the other hand many observers of the Jakarta scene see no evidence that the President regards his Timor policies as having failed. Having achieved unprecedented international standing as Chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the Asian Pacific Economic Co-operation forum (APEC), he does not need, they say, to give painful concessions to his foreign critics. Some add that he is as worried as the armed forces leaders about the consequences of admitting defeat in East Timor, particularly the consequences for maintaining control in Irian Jaya and Aceh.

This sceptical interpretation is sometimes combined with the view that Soeharto's perspectives on East Timor are much influenced by his son-in-law, Colonel Prabowo, a specialist on East Timor and a long-time hard-liner on Timor issues.

So far no senior figure in the Soeharto government has indicated that the government is willing to move towards a form of settlement far-reachingly different from today's status quo. On the other hand there have occasionally been suggestions that the government might be willing to grant East Timor the status of a special territory *(daerah wa)*. This status was granted to Aceh in 1962 as a result of negotiations to wind up a nine-year old rebellion. It initially gave the provincial government and legislative assembly wide powers over matters of religion, customs and education, though these were later whittled away.

Future

What might a durable settlement look like?

The logic of the analysis here is that only a settlement satisfactory to the East Timorese will be durable, and that such a settlement will be reached only if Indonesia negotiates with people who have wide support among them, including the leaders of the Resistance and Bishop Belo.

Such negotiations will presumably need to be accompanied or followed by the release of Xanana Gusmao. As the *Sydney Morning Herald's* 25 May 1993 editorial argued, Xanana is East Timor's Nelson Mandala. His authority will be needed if a settlement involving compromise with Indonesia is to stick. It will presumably be he who will moderate divisions among the Timorese, forestall and countervail violence, and mediate relations with Jakarta, in the difficult stages likely to follow an agreement.

Bishop Belo's contributions will probably also be of great importance, as those of Archbishop Tutu have been in South Africa. Mario Carrascalao, East Timor's Governor between 1982 and 1992, who has recently been appointed as Indonesia's Ambassador to Rumania, is a third Timorese with the potential to play unifying, stabilising and mediating roles.

Happily, these three - Xanana the guerrilla leader, Belo the cleric and Carrascalao the agricultural engineer whose ten years as governor gave him a detailed familiarity with Jakarta politics - have a good deal of trust and respect for each other. An agreement from which the three of them emerge in positions of authority and influence would be likely to be widely acceptable.

International guarantees will need to be part of any settlement for it to prove durable. International presences should include UN bodies as well as Portuguese and Australian consulates.

Moreover it is highly desirable that ASEAN should be part of the structure of international guarantees. The establishment of a Representative or Liaison Office accountable to the ASEAN Secretary General would be a major step forward for ASEAN as an institution. It would create hopeful precedents for the Muslim areas of Southern Thailand and the Southern Philippines as well as for Irian Jaya and Aceh.

Why should one expect such a settlement to become feasible? That expectation rests on three aspects of the situation. *Firstly*, it rests on the supposition that pressure on Indonesia from the US, Europe and other countries to open East Timor to human rights agencies and journalists is unlikely to wane.

Secondly, it rests on the view that the situation within East Timor remains explosive because of a persistent contradiction. On the one hand the Indonesian military sees anti-integrationist protest as subversive and believes in the need to act firmly to prevent and punish it. On the other hand young Timorese men will continue to be driven, by patriotism as carried in family memory, to demonstrate defiance of Indonesian authority; they will continue to put their lives at risk; and they will continue to enjoy the sympathy of the many in the outside world who believe strongly in the right to peaceful protest.

The current policies of the Indonesian government seem incapable of resolving this contradiction, and it is hard to see alternative policies which would be any more effective.

Thirdly, the expectation that a settlement will become feasible rests on assumptions about self determination pressures in other parts of the world. The last three years have seen self-determination realised and long-term occupation reversed in the three Baltic states, Namibia and Eritrea, and few doubt that ethno-nationalist demands will remain a major dimension of world politics. Those demands will require the leaders of the large states and of the UN system to give their attention to proposals for internationally guaranteed autonomy, and probably also to new roles for regional associations of states, if only to ward off the more destabilising possibility of having to allow changes of borders.

If the Israel-PLO agreement of September 1993 sticks it may prove to be a crucial milestone in moves towards a more confederalized world, a world in which there are many territories with internationally guaranteed autonomy, as well as "sovereign states", member states of federations, and provinces. The list of "trouble spots" which are candidates for internationally guaranteed autonomy is a long one, including Kashmir, Tibet, the Kurdish areas of Turkey and Iraq, Northern Ireland, Hong Kong, North Korea and the homelands of Zulus and Afrikaners in South Africa.

Source: Herb Feith, *The East Timor Issue Since the Capture of Xanana Gusmao*, East Timor Talks Campaign, Dec. 1993

Peace Proposal of the
National Council of Maubere Resistance
Conselho Nacional Da Resistencia Maubere
C.N.R.M.

The conflict in the former Southeast Asian Portuguese colony of East Timor, illegally invaded and annexed by Indonesia nearly 18 years ago, continues to fester away. Except for a few Indonesian military officials, there have been no winners in this tragedy, only many losers.

East Timorese people have been subjected to massive human rights violations of genocidal proportions. It is estimated that over one third of the population has died. Indonesia's image has been increasingly soiled internationally, exposing it to a growing number of punitive pressures from its erstwhile supporters. The strong stance taken by the US Clinton Administration has further increased the already excessively high cost to Indonesia of its East Timor policies. Not only have Indonesian people had to suffer many casualties from this ignoble war, but the obstinacy of their military leaders continues to burden national coffers, adversely affecting the country's development efforts.

Indonesia's suppression of legitimate East Timorese aspirations for respect of their human rights, including the right of self-determination, has been a cause for continued international tensions, affecting Jakarta's relations with neighbouring democracies such as Australia, the European Community, some APEC member states and others.

Consistent with the enhanced peace making and peace keeping role of the United Nations in the post-Cold War world, the leaders of CNRM - the East Timor Nationalist Resistance umbrella organisation - have advanced a plan to assist the UN Secretary General's mandate to find a solution to the East Timor conflict.

CNRM Special Representative and Co-Chairman Jose Ramos Horta presented a 3-phase peace plan, first articulated by Resistance Leader Commander Xanana Gusmao shortly before his capture. The plan has been backed by Commander Konis Santana, who currently leads the Armed Resistance. It is consistent with statements by East Timor Catholic Church leader Bishop Belo and has been endorsed by Portugal who presented it to the UN Secretary General.

The plan has also received enthusiastic support in the US, Europe, Canada and Japan. Indonesia's friends have been able to perceive its usefulness as a potential means of assisting Jakarta to extricate itself from its East Timor quagmire and conveniently resolve this issue.

The 3-phase East Timor Peace Plan is envisaged as follows:

Phase One - one to two years

Indonesia-Portugal talks under the auspices of the UN Secretary General, without initial East Timorese participation. Three such talks sessions have been held to date, with modest results so far. A Communique issued in New York after the last round of talks by the Foreign Ministers of both countries on 17 September 1993 gives reason for optimism, provided its points are actually implemented by Indonesia.

Subsequent talks, in which East Timorese need to be invited to participate, should aim to achieve:

- An immediate end to all armed activities in East Timor.
- Immediate and unconditional release of all East Timorese political prisoners.
- Significant reduction of the large numbers of Indonesian military personnel currently in the territory.
- Removal from East Timor of all heavy weapons, long range artillery pieces and armed transport equipment.
- Expansion of the presence and activities of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) into every district of East Timor and in strict observance of the Geneva Conventions.
- Significant reduction of Indonesian civil servants in the territory.
- A comprehensive population census to be undertaken by competent UN bodies.
- Access to the territory by UN Specialised Agencies such as FAO, UNDP, UNICEF, WHO and others, for the purpose of carrying out, within their respective fields of competence, a comprehensive program of restoration

TL 2012-10

East
Timor

EDUCATION KIT

East Timor:

What is to be done?

The action you can take depends to some extent on the nature of your government's relationship with Indonesia, but the main types of activities worth pursuing are:

Call on governments to:

* Support East Timor's right to self determination in the United Nations Assembly and for the UN General-Secretary to organise talks between Portugal, Indonesia and representatives of the East Timorese people, including the resistance and the church.

* Condemn Indonesia's human-rights violations at the UN Human Rights Commission and its Sub-Commission for the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, and in particular, press for the de-militarisation of East Timor, the release of all political prisoners and free access to East Timor by humanitarian and human rights organisations and the media.

* Call for a ban on the sale of all military hardware to Indonesia because of its illegal occupation of East Timor and the gross abuse of human rights throughout the Indonesian archipelago.

* Write letters of support to the Church in East Timor - give letter-link details.

* Your school may want to 'twin' with a school in East Timor - exchange letters, perhaps send much-needed education resources to a school in East Timor. Contact CISET, ETRA for details.

* Buy the *All In The Family* CD - all proceeds go towards scholarships for the many orphans in East Timor.

Lobby your elected representatives to:

* Press governments on these demands and to make preparations for a group of parliamentarians to visit East Timor. A request to visit East Timor should be addressed to the Indonesian Embassy in your country, citing the Statement issued by the UN Secretary-General after the UN-sponsored talks between the Foreign Ministers of Indonesia and Portugal in New York on 17 September 1993 which states that "both ministers...reaffirmed the need for further facilitating access to East Timor, *inter alia* by the United Nations and humanitarian and human rights organizations".

Call for the immediate and unconditional release of:

* *Xanana Gusmao*, leader of the East Timorese resistance, who is serving a 20-year sentence in Cipinang Prison, Jakarta.

* All *East Timorese political prisoners* being held in Dili and in various parts of Indonesia.

Messages of solidarity can be sent to *Xanana Gusmao, Fernando Araujo* (serving a nine-year sentence) and *Joao Freitas da Camara* (serving a 10-year sentence) at the following address:

Lembaga Pemasyarakatan Cipinang,
Jln Raya Bekasi Timur,
Jatinegara,
Jakarta Timur,
Indonesia.

Anniversaries to Remember for Special Campaigns

November 12: Santa Cruz massacre in 1991, when nearly 200 peaceful demonstrators were killed.

November 20: Xanana Gusmao's arrest in 1992.

November 28: East Timor's declaration of Independence in 1975.

December 7: Indonesia's invasion of East Timor in 1975.

Solidarity Groups

The following are some of the groups to which you can write

New South Wales

Christians in Solidarity with East Timor (CISET)
Uniya
24 Roslyn Street, Kings Cross, NSW 2011
Tel (02) 356 3888; Fax (02) 356 3021
e-mail: ciset@uniyajrs.apana.org.au

East Timor Relief Association (ETRA)
PO Box 23, Fairfield, NSW 2165
Tel (02) 728 7395 or (02) 891 5861
Fax (02) 891 2876 or (02) 726 6319

Australia-East Timor Association
PO Box 229 Darlinghurst, NSW 2010
Tel (02) 716 6354; Fax (02) 716 8266

East Timor Cultural Centre, Inc.
PO Box 425, Smithfield, NSW 2164

Victoria

Australia-East Timor Association
PO Box 93, Fitzroy, Victoria 3065
Tel (03) 489 7661; Fax C/- (03) 416 2746
Write for a free Resource List.

East Timor Talks Campaign
124 Napier Street, Fitzroy, Victoria 3065
Tel (03) 417 7505: Fax (03) 416 2746

Catholic Regional College - The East Timor Project
Box 5, Sydenham, Victoria 3038
Tel 390 1444: Fax 390 2096

Mr Jack de Groot
Catholic Commission for Justice Development & Peace
Albert Street, East Melbourne
Tel (03) 639 4399; Fax (03) 639 4180

Queensland

East Timor Solidarity Network
C/- Christians for Peace
84 Park Road, Woolloongabba, Qld 4102
Tel (07) 391 1692

South Australia

Campaign for Independent East Timor(CIET)
1st Floor, 155 Pirie Street, Adelaide, SA 5000
Tel (08) 269 6252

Cathy Whewell - CISET
Social Justice Secretariat
39 Wakefield Street, Adelaide, SA 5000

Western Australia

Friends of East Timor
PO Box 661, Doubleview WA
Tel (09) 381 2474

Sr Veronica Martin
Australian Catholic Social Justice Council
PO Box 1217, Perth, WA 6011

Tasmania

Hobart East Timor Committee
1/65 Bay Road, New Town, Tas 7008
Tel (002) 28 2727

Australian Capital Territory

Campaign for an Independent East Timor (CIET)
PO Box 3514, Manuka, ACT 2603
Tel (06) 248 5027

Northern Territory

Australians for a Free East Timor (AFET)
GPO Box 2155, Darwin, NT 0801
Tel (089) 83 2113

1988	
February:	Detailed reports of 439 human rights abuses presented to UN Human Rights Commission. Seven Timorese arrested and tortured in Aileu on suspicion of supplying information to ICRC personnel.
March:	Fighting reported near border with West Timor. Timorese studying in Indonesia are reported under constant surveillance.
May:	New offensive to capture Fretilin under way.
June:	Many Timorese children said to have died mysteriously after visiting Dili Hospital.
1989	
January:	Eight of East Timor's 13 districts are opened to outside visitors. For Australian citizens this means not even a visa is required. Visits to the east are rare. Visitors note the climate of fear and strong military presence. Visitors are told by authorities that there are no more Fretilin fighters.
February:	Bishop Belo writes to the UN Secretary-General appealing for a referendum on their future for the East Timorese, whose 'culture and identity are dying'.
8 June:	President Suharto wins UN Medal for Indonesian family planning programme.
July:	Round-ups and a short offensive before Pope's visit.
August:	Governor Carrascalao states malaria is endemic, 70 per cent of the population have tuberculosis, 61 districtshave only 40 doctors, and illiteracy is 92 per cent.
October:	Pope visits Indonesia and East Timor. A pro-independence demonstration occurs; many detentions and abuses are
reported	after it, schools are closed etc.
12 December:	Australia and Indonesia sign Timor Gap Treaty.
1990	
January:	A demonstration by young Timorese who speak with visiting American ambassador John Monjo; they are brutally beaten after his departure.
March:	Large new Indonesian offensive is launched.
June:	A study by a team from Indonesia's prestigious Gadjah Mada University concludes that East Timor still suffers war conditons and continuing trauma.
September:	Australian lawyer Robert Domm interviews Xanana Gusmao.
Oct. 1990- *Feb. 1991:*	Widespread Indonesian military operations lead the military to claim that they have broken the Resistance.
1991	
	Details of some human rights abuses in 1990 with names, places, dates, battalion numbers responsible etc. collected through diverse sources: 316 detentions with torture; 180 detentions with no treatment details; 58 extrajudicial killings; 44 disappearances; 16 rapes.
	In preparation for a proposed Portuguese parliamentary delegation visit, many young Timorese are removed to work/ training programmes on other islands. Portuguese visit does not go ahead.
28 *October:*	Sebastiao Gomes Rangel, sanctuary-seeker, and a youth called Alfonso, who is claimed to be an Intelligence agent, are killed when Motael Church, Dili, is surrounded late at night. Churches in other towns also reported attacked.
12 *November:*	Indonesian troops fire on mourners at Santa Cruz cemetery; many are killed. Many wounded, and some witnesses disappear or go into hiding. The presence of some Western press makes this world news.
	Round-ups of witnesses and further killings are reported in following weeks.
1992	
Early to mid-year:	Indonesian government inquiry into above, very few Timorese witnesses available. Senior army commander replaced with more hard-line commander. Timorese, some beaten unrecognisable in detention, are tried for organising or taking part in demonstrations and spreading information about human rights abuses; they receive sentences of up to life imprisonment; Indonesian military are court-martialled for Dili 'incident'; most are disciplined, but some lower ranks receive prison sentences of up to 18 months.
March:	*Lusitania Expresso* peace boat turned back by Indonesian warships in attempt to visit East Timor.
April:	Australian Prime Minister Keating visits Indonesia; announces aid to Indonesian government for a clean water project in Dili.
June:	Indonesian Timor commander (Brigadier-General Syafei) claims that only 300 Fretilin fighters are left in the mountains.
July:	East Timor still open but visitors speak of climate of fear, oppressive military and Intelligence presence, andreluctance of locals to be seen speaking to visitors.
November:	Falintil leader, Xanana Gusmao, arrested.
1993	
April:	Falintil leader, Mau Honu, arrested.
1994	
	THE STRUGGLE CONTINUES ...

Source: Michele Turner, *Telling - East Timor: Personal Testimonies 1942-1992*, UNSW Press, Kensington 1992.

TL2012-11

East Timor
EDUCATION KIT

Chronology:
1400s to 1994

CHRONOLOGY

(The details of Japanese serving in 1942 are derived from the Military History Department, National Institute of Defence Studies, Tokyo. Abbreviations: Bn. = Battalion; Coy. = Company; Div. = Division; Regt = Regiment.)

1400s	Chinese trading of Timorese sandalwood.
1514	First recorded Portuguese contact with Timor.
1566	Portuguese Dominican missionaries settle on Solor and begin to convert people of nearby islands including Timor.
1641	Portuguese lose Malacca to the Dutch, who make limited inroads into Western Timor.
1789	Captain Bligh sights Timor after 41 days in an open boat cast adrift by *Bounty* mutineers in the Pacific.
1834	Missionaries are expelled from Portuguese Timor for 40 years, reputedly for championing the locals.
1896	Eastern Timor becomes a separately administered Portuguese colony (earlier controlled through Goa/Macau).
1912	Timorese uprising against Portuguese colonial control, led by Dom Boaventura, brutally quashed.
1914	Agreement finalised between Holland and Portugal on boundaries: Dutch West and Portuguese East Timor.
1926	Oil exploration concessions in Portuguese Timor granted to an Australian company.
1932	Japanese invade northern China, war continues there.
1939	World War 2 begins, Allies versus Axis powers.
1940	27 September Japan signs agreement with Axis powers giving it, after victory, claim to most of Asia and the Pacific.

1941	
January:	Qantas begins regular flying-boat flights Darwin to Dili.
13 April:	Australian officer David Ross posted to Dili to monitor Japanese.
June:	Manuel de Jesus Pires offers to secretly clear land for airfield for Allies.
7 December:	Japanese bomb and destroy American fleet at Pearl Harbour; Pacific War starts.
12 December:	'Sparrow Force'(2/40th Bn. and various artillery, engineering, signals and ancillary units as well as a new commando unit, the 2/2nd Ind. Coy.) sail from Darwin to Kupang to help Netherlands garrison in Dutch West Timor against possible Japanese attack.
17 December:	Joint Dutch and Australian Forces (2/2nd Ind. Coy.) invade Portuguese Timoragainst diplomatic protests of Governor.

1942	
26 January:	First of many Japanese air strikes on Dutch Timor
30 January:	Japanese land on Ambon, which soon falls.
15 February:	Singapore falls to Japanese.
19 February:	Japanese aircraft raid Darwin; 8 ships and 24 aircraft, the post and administrative offices are destroyed; 250 people killed and 320 wounded.
20 February:	Japanese invade Dutch West and Portuguese East Timor (1st and 3rd Bns. of 228th Army Regt. and 800 naval paratroopers land near Kupang, approx. 3000 men; 2nd Bn., 228th Regt. near Dili, with attached units approx. 1000 men).
23 February:	Australian Force in Dutch Timor overcome, become POWs.
9 March:	Netherlands East Indies surrender.
13 March:	David Ross sent to request Australian commandos in Portuguese Timor to surrender; they refuse.
Mid-March:	Over 140 Australian troops escape Dutch Timor and join commandos in the east.
13 April:	Australians on Timor obtain a radio receiver and hear that Darwin is not enemy-controlled.
20 April:	Australians improvise a transmitter, nicknamed 'Winnie', and reestablish contact with Darwin.
2 May:	Portuguese Post Office long-range aeronautical Morse radio (AWA AS9) smuggled to Australians.
May:	Japanese send more troops to Timor (the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Bns of 47th Regt. of 48th Div.). The Japanese main force is always headquartered near the best harbour of Kupang. Australian successes include a night raid on Japanese in Dili and an ambush in which a famous officer ('the Singapore Tiger') is killed. Allied bombing of Timor towns begins in earnest and continues until August 1945.
June:	David Ross is again sent to offer surrender. He is evacuated to Australia.
July:	'Lizard' Army Intelligence party inserted to operate eastern end of Timor under two British army captains.
August:	Japanese bring up the other two battalions (of 228th Regt.) and start a drive ('August Push') against Australians. They burn out large areas but are withdrawn for service elsewhere before they overcome Australians.
August-September:	Japanese promote uprisings in the Maubisse-Mindelo-Turiscai area; Portuguese/Timorese bring in troops and volunteers to quell them.
23 September:	*Voyager is* grounded bringing in relief 2/4th Ind. Coy., so approx. 700 Australians now in Timor.

September:	Japanese send more troops to Timor (4th Amoured Tank Regt. and 1st and 2nd Taiwan Infantry Regts), pprox. 15,000 Japanese troops now present in Timor.
November:	Cinematographer Damien Parer and two journalists visit the Timor campaign. Japanese order Portuguese officials to assemble by 15 November for internment; any not doing so will be regarded as actively assisting Australians.
16 December:	Evacuation of original 2/2nd Ind. Coy. on Dutch destroyer *Tjerk Hiddes.*
1943	
9 January:	Evacuation of most of 2/4th Ind. Coy. on destroyer *Arunta.*
10 February:	Evacuation of remaining 16 Australian commandos (volunteers for Intelligence gathering) and 'Lizard' Z party, on American submarine *Gudgeon.*
1 July:	'Lagarto' Intelligence party inserted, five operatives (4 Portuguese/Timorese, 2 Australian) joined by many Timorese. Most of party captured, imprisoned, tortured and radio link compromised from 29 September 1943. Jim Ellwood (captured) and Pat da Luz (free) survive.
1944	
29 January:	'Cobra' Intelligence party (3 Timorese, 2 Australians) inserted. All captured, tortured. Capt. Cashman and Sancho da Silva survive.
May:	'Adder' party inserted (3 Timorese, 2 Australians) captured and died imprisoned.
17May:	Plane taking 'Sunbaker' party for reconnaissance crashes; all killed.
1945	
27June:	'Sunable' party (4 Australians) inserted Oecusse, all captured, 3 survive.
29June:	'Sunlag' party (2 Australians, 1 Timorese) inserted. Capt. Stevenson and Celestino dos Anjos survive.
2 July:	'Suncob' party inserted (2 Australians), captured, tortured, both survive.
15 August:	Japan surrenders; Pacific War ceases.
24 September:	Ceremony to celebrate peace in Dili.
December:	Timorese evacuated to Australia return home.
1949	
	Indonesian independence gained after three years of war against Dutch colonial power. Sukarno is president.
1963	
May:	By an 'Act of Free Choice' Indonesia gains control of West New Guinea; renames it Irian Jaya.
1963-66	
	Konfrontasi: Indonesia fights over incorporation of parts of northern Borneo into Malaysia.
1965	
	After a mutiny within the army, at least 500 000 people massacred and thousands imprisoned in Indonesia to quash Communist Party. Suharto and his 'New Order' come to power.
1974	
April:	Democratic army officers seize control in Portugal bringing to an end the fascist dictatorship. Political parties allowed in Portuguese Timor. Two, UDT and Fretilin, enjoy most support, both wish independence. Four smaller were: Apodeti, Kota, Aditla, Trabalhista
1975	
11 August:	UDT stage coup against Fretilin, two weeks of constant fighting, two intermittent; 1500-2300 fighters die; 10,000 UDT supporters flee across border to Atambua.
27 August	Portuguese Governor and administration withdraw to island of Atauro, within sight of Dili.
September:	Portuguese officers leave garrisons, hand over command to Timorese NCOs. Indonesian commandos attack Bobonaro border garrison in Portuguese Timor.
October:	Indonesian troops with some Timorese refugees attack border towns of Batugade, Maliana and Balibo (where five Australian-employed newsmen are killed 16 October). Australian DSD (Defence Signals Directorate) secretly monitor radio traffic of Timor war and continue to do so.
28 November:	Fretilin declares Timorese Independence.
6 December:	US President Ford and Henry Kissinger banquet with President Suharto in Jakarta.
7 December:	Full-scale Indonesian invasion of Dili. Timorese everywhere flee to high mountains, stay there next 3-4 years, bombarded and encircled. Death toll massive, Indonesian sources put at over 100 000. United Nations continues to pass resolutions calling for troop withdrawals, decolonisation etc. Massive Indonesian military operations continue.
	US, UK and Australia supply military equipment and training to Indonesia for next 16 years.
1976	
	Indonesia claims an 'Act of Integration' has taken place, UN disagrees. Australia gives de facto recognition to annexation. Informal negotiations for seabed boundary for Timor Gap oil exploration begin between Indonesia and Australia. Attempts by Australian citizens to aid East Timorese or spread information about their plight prevented by Australian authorities. Some examples: Darwin resident Rob Wesley-Smith has a boatload of medical supplies confiscated; Tasmanian pensioner and ham radio enthusiast Ian Nichols has his licence revoked for picking up and passing on messages from Timor; over the years various other radios making contact have been tracked and confiscated.
1977	
	Large-scale fighting continues. Indonesian Adam Malik is reported (in *Sydney Morning Herald)* as saying '50,000 people or perhaps 80,000 might have been killed during the war in East Timor.'

1978	
October:	Australian Intelligence reports that Fretilin forces control most of East Timor.
December:	Australia gives de jure recognition to annexation. Fretilin leader Nicolau Lobato killed near Turiscai.
1979	
March:	International Red Cross (ICRC) first allowed into East Timor. They report widespread starvation imminent.
	Timorese are put into resettlement villages.
	Resistance fighters regroup under Xanana Gusmao.
	Limited relief programmes begin 1979-80. From now on the following begin to be routinely reported: misappropriation of food and medical aid by military; use of napalm; payment of substantial bribes for exit visas; deportations to Atauro; attacks on Indonesian garrisons by Resistance fighters.
1980	
	Timor Timur designated official transmigration area.
	Indonesian minister Mochtar says 120 000 died since 1975, and only half the population are under Indonesian control.
1981	
July-August:	Massive recruitment of civilians to assist in huge military 'fence of legs' operation in the east, which becomes known later as 'LaklutaMassacres'.
1982	
February:	Visiting ICRC delegation report food shortages imminent (due to lack of planting because of military operations), as do TImorese Catholic Church sources.
March:	Australian ex-Prime Minister Whitlam spends three days seeing East Timor by helicopter. Calls Mgr Lopes 'mendacious' for predicting famine.
April:	ICRC begins emergency food programme.
May:	An Australian Senate Inquiry on East Timor begins taking testimony. First Indonesian government elections in East Timor.
December:	Nine captured Indonesian military instruction manuals (for undermining widespread Resistance networks in camps and towns and precautions when torturing) are released and authenticated by Amnesty International.
From mid-1980s:	Timorese studying at Indonesian universities are reasonably free to send mail and phone from outside.
	Expatriate communities begin to get detailed information, become galvanised and more active.
1983	
23 March:	Indonesian commander Purwanto secretly signs a ceasefire agreement with Resistance leader Xanana.
February:	Colonel Purwanto claims to visiting journalist that only a few hundred Fretilin remain.
	Use of contraceptive Depo Provera first reported.
May:	Mgr Lopes is pressured to resign, replaced by Bishop Belo, a Timorese long absent.
June:	Evidence (documents, photos, tapes) of the ceasefire released world-wide.
28-31 July:	An Australian parliamentary delegation led by Bill Morrison visits East Timor, and reports that all is fine. ICRC made to leave as usual before an offensive.
August:	General Murdani announces Fretilin will be crushed without mercy. Huge widespread offensive launched, first in Kraras; massacres ensue in following weeks.
September:	Australian Senate InquLry and parliamentary delegation's reports both issued, former critical, latter not.
	Colonel Purwanto is replaced.
1984	
February:	Reports of first political trials in East Timor.
May:	Letter by Bishop Belo reports disappearances, summary executions, presence of 10,000 Indonesian troops.
1985	
January:	Indonesian government publishes a five-year plan; birth control for 95,000 Timorese women and resettlement of 6800 transmigrants.
July:	US government report estimates 12 000 Indonesian troops in East Timor.
18 August:	Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke recognises Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor.
	Massacre of a village and widespread fighting reported.
1986	
March:	Oil company bids for seabed exploration reported to have earned Australian government A$31.5 million.
	UDT and Fretilin's external leadership form a coalition.
August:	Governor Carrascalao reports that there are 13 000 widows in East Timor.
September:	Smuggled letters describe widespread arrests.
October:	East Timor's first university opened.
November:	Twelve Indonesian battalions are reported to be hunting Xanana Gusmao.
25 November:	Four Timorese students fearful of torture are refused asylum in Dutch Embassy, Jakarta.
1987	
March:	38,000 East Timorese children reported to be suffering malnutrition.
	An Indonesian offensive launched on south coast.
April:	Indonesian ambassador to Australia announces there are 15 000 Indonesian troops in East Timor.
July:	Another offensive launched in the east.
November:	Malnutrition reported in southern East Timor.
December:	General Murdani estimates Fretilin strength at 500.

TL 2012-12

East Timor
EDUCATION KIT

East Timor: Resources 1

Speakers & Contacts

NEW SOUTH WALES

O'CONNOR Sr. Kathleen, Christians In Solidarity with East Timor (CISET), PO Box 522, 24 Roslyn St., Kings Cross, NSW 2011, Tel (02) 356 3888 & Fax (02) 356 3021
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TIMORESE ASSOCIATION OF VICTORIA, Tel (03) 302 1896
BYRNE Louise, 3/114 Wellington St., St Kilda, Vic. 3142, Tel (03)510 2193(H) or (03) 662 2822(W), Mon-Wed am.
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GRAHAM Denis, Sydenham Catholic College, Vic, Tel (03) 390 1444
GRAHAM Denis, Curriculum Coordinator of the Catholic Regional College, Sydenham, Vic. has introduced studies on East Timor into the college's curriculum and has established a school twinning program with East Timor. He, Cathy Boyle or Brian Petty can be contacted at the school Tel (03) 390 1444
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HERD John, SFX Seminary, 101 Morialta Rd., Rostrevor, Adelaide, SA 5073, Tel (08) 337 7953
CAMPAIGN FOR INDEPENDENT EAST TIMOR, (C/- Janet Meade/Romero Group), 1st Floor, 155 Pirie St., Adelaide, SA 5000, Tel (08) 269 6252

WESTERN AUSTRALIA

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BRADY Sr Veronica, C/- English Department, University of Western Australia, Nedlands, WA 6007
STEWART Peter, Australian Catholic Social Justice Council, PO Box 1217, Perth, WA 6001

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TASMANIA

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FISHER Irene, Kingston Downs, Maddocks Rd., Kingston, Tasmania 7050
SMITH Paul, Tas., Tel (002) 622133
HERRERA Jennie, Tasmania Timor Support Group, 2/65 Bay Rd., Newtown, Hobart, Tas. 7008

AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY

COLLAERY Bernard, ACT, (06) 239 6239(H) & (06) 239 6033(W)

A group of East Timorese youth have undergone training in public speaking and are available to talk to students about the situation in their homeland. Two of these young people went on a speaking tour of the United Nations and the United States of America. To contact them, you can contact Louise Byrne on (03) 510 2193 for Victorian speakers or Kathleen O'Connor on (02) 356 3888 for NSW speakers.

TL 2012+13

East Timor

EDUCATION KIT

East Timor: Resources 2

AETA

Australia-East Timor Association

P.O. Box 93, Fitzroy, Victoria 3065, Australia

BOOKS, BADGES, STICKERS etc.

BOOKS	$ Price	$ Postage
A CRITIQUE OF WESTERN JOURNALISM AND SCHOLARSHIP ON EAST TIMOR by Geoffrey C Gunn (with Jefferson Lee). Journal of Contemporary Asia Publishers, Manila 1994. 265 pages.	20.00	0.00
A TRAVELLER'S DICTIONARY IN TETUN-ENGLISH AND ENGLISH-TETUN FROM THE LAND OF THE SLEEPING CROCODILE: EAST TIMOR: by Cliff Morris. Baba Dook Books, Melbourne 1992. Contains an introduction to Timorese culture, grammar, pronunciation, phrases for travellers and dictionaries. 77 pages. Convenient pocket size paperback with durable plastic cover.	6.95	1.00
DEATH IN DILI by Andrew McMillan. Hodder 8 Stoughton, Sydney 1992. An Australian tourist from Darwin gets involved in Timor's politics while holidaying on the island. A documentary account. told in a racy style. 235 pages.Paperback.	15.95	0.00
EAST TIMOR: An Indonesian intellectual speaks out. George J. Adjitondro. Edited by Herb Feith, Emma Baulch and Pat Walsh. Australian Council for Overseas Aid, 1994. Introduction by Herb Feith. Includes a report on the state of the environment in East Timor and a transcript of George Aditjondro's interview on ABC-TV's *Lateline* programme. 65 pages. Paperback.	8.00	1.00
EAST TIMOR: An International Responsibility. A Catholic Institute of International Relations 'Comment' series booklet. London 1992. 28 pages.	3.00	1.00
EAST TIMOR: Betrayed but not Beaten - The Ongoing Struggle for Independence in East Timor 1975-83 by Ian Bell et al. Australia-East Timor Association, Melbourne 1983. 33 pages. Paperback.	1.00	1.00
EAST TIMOR: Getting Away with Murder? by Hugh O'Shaughnessy. British Coalition for East Timor, London 1994. Features many excellent photographs by the author. 32 pages. Paperback.	15.00	0.00
THE EAST TIMOR ISSUE SINCE THE CAPTURE OF XANANA GUSMAO by Herb Feith. Text of a submission to the Australian Parliament's Human Rights Committee. East Timor Talks Campaign, Melbourne 1994. 37 pages.	4.00	1.00
EAST TIMOR: The Silence and the betrayal. New Internationalist, Oxford 1994. The March issue of The NI, a magazine about the North/South, focuses on East Timor. Highly recommended. 36 pages.	4.75	1.00
I AM TIMORESE: Testimonies from East Timor. Catholic Institute for International Relations, London 1990. 41 pages. Paperback.	7.00	1.00
INDONESIA'S FORGOTTEN WAR: The Hidden History of East Timor by John G. Taylor. Zed Books, London and Pluto Press, Sydney 1991. 230 pages. Highly recommended. Paperback.	24.95	0.00
MAI KOLIA TETUN: A Course in Tetum-Praca, The Lingua Franca of East Timor by Geoffrey Hull. Australian Catholic Relief and the Australian Catholic Social Justice Council, North Sydney 1993. A text book of the Tetum language. 297 pages. Paperback	17.0	2.00
'OPENING UP': Travellers' Impressions of East Timor, 1989-1991. Edited by Kirsty Sword and Pat Walsh. Australia-East Timor Association, Melbourne 1991. 50 pages. Paperback.	5.00	1.00
TELLING: East Timor: Personal testimonies 1942-1992 by Michele Turner. NSW University Press, Sydney 1992. Interviews with Timorese people about the often horrific events they have lived through. World War II Australian commandos also recollect experiences. 218 pages. Paperback	19.95	0.00
THE CHURCH AND EAST TIMOR: A collection of documents by National and International Catholic Church Agencies. Catholic Commission for Justice, Development and Peace, Melbourne 1994.	7.00	1.00
THE REDUNDANCY OF COURAGE by Timothy Mo. Chatto & Windus, London 1991. A gripping novel about events in the imaginary island nation of Danu which bears a strong resemblance to East Timor. Shortlisted for the 1991 Booker Prize. 408 pages. Remainder copy. Clothbound. Vintage London 1992. Paperback	10.95 14.95	2.00 2.00
TIMOR: Legends and Poems from the Land of the Sleeping Crocodile by Cliff Morris. H.C. Morris, Melbourne 1984. Parallel English-Tetun text. 209 pages. Paperback.	7.50	1.00

BADGES

HANDS OFF EAST TIMOR'S OIL. Black/Sea Green. (AETA).	1.00	1.00
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I'M STILL FIGHTING by Agio Pereira. 3CR, Melbourne 1990. 13 songs. Cassette.	14.95	2.00
MY COUNTRY by Midnight Oil. On Side 2 Midnight Oil and the Xanana Choir sing the traditional Timorese tune Quoll Mai with words by Francisco Borja da Costa. Columbia. Sydney 1993. CD single.	6.00	2.00
WE CAN'T BE BEATEN by Paul Stewart and Colin Buckler from Painters and Dockers, David Bridie from Not Drowning Waving and various East Timorese musicians including Zeni Gusmao. B side: Hamutuk by Angelo Madeira (Sung in Tetum). Melbourne 1993. (AETA). Cassette single.	6.00	2.00

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BOYCOTT BALI! Full Colour. (AETA). Folded.	2.00	1.00
In mailing tube	2.00	5.00*

ADDITIONAL RESOURCES

TELLING - EAST TIMOR: PERSONAL TESTIMONIES 1942-1992, Michelle Turner UNSW Press, 1992
INSIDE INDONESIA. Informative magazine available from ACFOA. Contact Pat Walsh, 143 Napier St., Fitzroy, Melbourne, Victoria 3065
THE EAST TIMOR ISSUE SINCE THE CAPTURE OF XANANA GUSMAO, East Timor Talks Campaign, Dec. 1993. Available from ETTC, 124 Napier St., Fitzroy, Melbourne, Victoria 3065
NEW INTERNATIONALIST, a monthly magazine available on subscription for $46.50 p.a. Contact 7 Hutt St., Adelaide, S.A. 5000
DEATH OF A NATION. Video: purchase price $39.50; hire $10.00. Contact 24 Empire St., Haberfield, Sydney, NSW 2045
MARY MACKILLOP INSTITUTE OF EAST TIMORESE STUDIES, P.O. Box 4041, Baulkham Hills, Sydney, NSW 2153. Ph. (02) 634 2317

TRADING TERMS

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Overseas orders: Please specify air mail / economy air / surface mail. (NB: Postage rates quoted above are for Australian orders only.) The equivalent of A$5 must be added to all payments NOT made in Australian dollars to cover bank charges.
One third discount for East Timor solidarity groups (unless otherwise stated) plus postage and packing. (Bulk orders only).
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